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The economics of security is one of the most important issues in our discipline, yet, the one 
least researched (Martin Feldstein (5. 1. 2007), Former President of the American Economics 
Association. 
“Economic theory in particular can offer key insights, enabling governments to optimise their 
efforts to enhance security and growth” (ESRAB, 2006). 
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In particular after the devastating attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 
2001 (henceforth 9/11), the (economic) analysis of terrorism has gained in importance in 
(economic) research. Some contributions have focused on the causes of terrorism, asking, 
e.g., whether terrorism is rooted in poor political and economic conditions (i.e., in repression 
and poverty). Others have centered on the consequences of terrorism. For instance, (global) 
terrorism may damage economic growth and globalization, e.g., by reducing trade flows and 
investment flows. The interaction of terrorism and counter-terrorism has also been the center 
of some academic interest, given that the fight against terrorism also has noticeable economic 
consequences of its own accord, e.g., by affecting the ease of travel and trade and by diverting 
public investment to internal security. 
This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of 
terrorism and counter-terrorist measures.1 We first take a look on existing evidence on the 
causes of terrorism. That is, we assemble the evidence on the drivers and determinants of 
various forms of terrorism taking place in various parts of the world. Knowing the ‘roots’ of 
terrorism is helpful to assess the benefits of security policies and their interactions with the 
economy. Then, we consider the evidence on the consequences of terrorism, where we focus 
on its economic impacts, while also alluding to its political or social effects. By describing the 
academic research on the various negative effects of terrorism, we show why it is important to 
regarding the issue of counter-terrorism policies. Moreover, our survey also presents the exist-
ing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security (with a 
particular focus on terrorism) in a comprehensive manner. It incorporates an analysis of the 
level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy to show in 
which way interactions manifest. Relevant knowledge on the interaction between the costs of 
both terrorism and anti-terrorism measures is identified as well. 
This survey focuses on perspectives and methodologies from the discipline of economics but 
also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). The related non-
economic literature is not only extensive but also complements the economics literature, e.g., 
as it covers some issues and aspects which have so far been overlooked by many economists. 
                                                                          
1 However, one should note that most countries are yet not sufficiently prepared to intellectually meet this new 
type of research, as their capacity for economic analysis and policy making in this field is still weak, especially in 
comparison with the United States. This is a result from several factors: first, the large geographical dispersion of 
economic research capacity on terrorism and anti-terror policy; second, the spread of experts across many differ-
ent sub-disciplines in economics, which often do not communicate with each other; third, the fact that many 
authors publishing books and articles in the field of economics of security usually work on other themes and 
simply lend their expertise to the analysis of terror-related economic phenomena on a temporary basis, thus 
making experts on economics of security a very transient phenomenon. Still, the economic literature on terrorism 
has made remarkable inroads (e.g., Landes 1978; Frey 2004; Brück 2006; Enders and Sandler 2006; Krueger 
2007; Keefer and Loayza 2008; Bird et al. 2008) building on already available research, which had previously not 
received much attention. Nevertheless, despite of remarkable progress, different areas of research remain insuffi-
ciently integrated and various aspects still need to be studied in depth (cf. Llussa and Tavares 2008). Introduction 
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Arguably, economics contributes to the study of terrorism with important tools, yet it is not 
sufficient to provide an understanding of all the complexities of the security-insecurity nexus. 
Our survey assesses the degree of available information on the causes of terrorism, as they 
follow from an economic analysis of the issue. It also assembles the knowledge on the impact 
of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables, and its impact on 
specific sectors. Furthermore, it assesses how potential and actual terrorist events determine 
consumer and producer behavior, public policy as well as terrorist responses to these policies. 
Apart from the impacts on the respective economic levels, distributional effects are analyzed 
including the distribution of impacts between segments within an economy and between 
economies within the international economic system. In Section 2 we discuss some definitions 
and concepts which should be reflected before starting an in-depth discussion. The main part 
of our survey (Sections 3 to 7) is divided into several sections: 
1.  The causes of terrorism (Section 3) are discussed in order to understand which factors 
(determinants) motivate the production of terrorism and terrorist attacks. After presenting 
several global hypotheses that link certain country-specific factors to the risk of a country 
producing terrorism or being attacked by it, we review the existing evidence, distinguish-
ing between several analytical perspectives. If it is possible to identify the “true” determi-
nants of terrorism, then it is also possible to “drain the swamp” by applying respective pol-
icy actions. Such actions should help to reduce terrorism, thus also reducing the first-order 
(direct) and second-order (indirect) effects of terrorism on affected economies. 
2.  The impacts of terrorism (Section 4) account for the direct (first-order) economic reper-
cussions to the economy from a risky event (Enders and Sandler 2006; Brück 2006) both at 
macro- and micro-economic level. These impacts correspond to the aftermath of an event 
and deal with the immediate reaction of victims to a terrorist attack. Many studies exist 
which provide overviews and summarize the impacts of terrorism, yet, these studies do not 
differentiate between various (temporal) stages of terrorist events and their repercussions. 
One may distinguish between (i) the direct short-run response triggered by the event itself, 
(ii) the medium- to long-term responses induced by fear and resulting security responses of 
agents, which (iii) will in turn trigger reactions by terrorists. Most existing studies attribute 
the dynamic repercussions of terrorism to the terrorist event itself, even though the extent 
of indirect effects is largely determined by the reactions of targets rather than terrorist ac-
tions. This distinction is critical as it provides a perspective on relative dimensions of the 
economic repercussions of the actual attacks versus the economic repercussion of respon-
sive actions, which at least in theory could be reduced through adequate management of a 
post- and pre-terror situation. 
3.  The dynamic analysis of both terrorism attacks and security measures (Sections 5) recog-
nizes that terrorists’ behavior will respond to both previous terrorist events and to security 
measures of public and private agents. These adjustments in behavior (e.g., in the nature of 
attacks and in the type of target) will in turn result in a changed aggregate impact of terror-Introduction 
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ist attacks. In other words, security responses do not only contribute to the total costs of a 
past terrorist event but also partly determine the economic repercussions of terrorism in the 
future. 
4.  The economic impacts of security measures (Section 6) or indirect (second-order) costs of 
terrorism result from the responses of agents to re-establish an environment of security. 
Brück (2006) further differentiates between impacts on private security spending and on 
public policy. These adjustment activities occur between terrorist events, i.e., they are ac-
tivities which attempt to prevent an attack altogether, or target to minimize the impacts and 
thus costs from an actual attack. They do not only arise from public security policies but 
are also a result of changes in behavior at individual level which lead to a changed alloca-
tion of resources to consumption and production. Consequently, the ultimate impact of ter-
rorism is not only determined by the nature of the terrorist attack but also by the reactions 
of the respective agents, leading to the hypothesis that indirect impacts, i.e., impacts result-
ing from security reactions could outweigh the direct impacts of terrorist attacks them-
selves (Chen and Siems 2004; Brück 2006).  
5.  The European perspective on the terrorism-security nexus (Section 7) is finally discussed 
in order to apply the discussion to the European theatre. Here, we want to discuss the 
causes of terrorism in Europe and the first- and second-order effects of terrorism on the 
economy and society as a whole. Also, we want to have a look at counter-terrorism poli-
cies and their interaction with terrorism and the economy. We in particular focus at policy 
actions undertaken by the European Union (EU). 
 
 
2  DEFINTIONS AND CONCEPTS 
The 9/11 terror attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center in New York and subsequent 
attacks in Europe have introduced a new dimension of terrorism. 9/11 and other terror attacks 
have challenged existing notions on the “ethics” or behavior of terrorist organizations and 
created a new atmosphere of uncertainty. As the unimaginable happened, large scale terrorist 
events since 2001 have turned a low probability event into an event with a higher likelihood, 
but also into an event whose likelihood cannot be estimated. In other words, what was previ-
ously rejected as significantly unlikely has now become not only possible but also probable. 
Yet, given lack of data it is difficult to predict the actual level of probability. Consequently, 
although previous historic incidences (e.g., nuclear accidents) had enhanced the awareness of 
living in a “risk society”, 9/11 has further influenced conceptions of risk, insecurity and secu-
rity. In this section we want to give a brief overview of basic concepts and their implications, 
before offering an in-depth view on the issue of terrorism and its (economic) analysis. Definitions and Concepts 
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2.1  Risk and insecurity  
Brück (2006) defines insecurity as an “aggregate, unquantifiable form of risk”, risk as the 
probability of a harmful event to happen (where the level of risks rises with an indicator being 
close to its threshold) and consequently, security as the absence of this risk, i.e., a zero prob-
ability of a harmful event to happen. A similar concept has been provided early on by Knight 
(1921) who differentiates between risk and uncertainty. Risk is a known entity to the extent 
that its probability can be estimated, e.g., based on certain variables which have been derived 
historically or through research; yet, uncertainty implies the impossibility to quantify the 
probability of an event to happen. In sharp contrast to, e.g., natural disasters which are pre-
dictable to some extent, terrorists deliberately seek to evade attempts for prediction, thus 
reproducing uncertainty or creating an environment of “dynamic insecurity”. 
Terrorism is not the only source of insecurity but one among many others, such as organized 
crime, political instability or economic shocks, natural disasters or industrial accidents. Con-
sequently, the risk of terrorism is defined not only by its own absolute probability but also by 
the likelihood of other events to happen. Given that the “portfolio of risks” and their likeli-
hoods vary across time, across countries and across stakeholders, the importance that is as-
signed to a particular element of insecurity (e.g., terrorism) and its salience on the policy 
agenda will vary as well. Moreover, the notion of risk is not objectively defined but strongly 
influenced by individual’s perceptions and risk aversion which is often based on cognitive 
experiences of the past rather than estimations of probability of future events. 
2.2 Security 
The phenomenon of “dynamic insecurity” has important repercussions on notions of “secu-
rity” and security provision. As Auerswald et al. (2005) suggests, the goals of security provi-
sion need to be redefined, shifting away from the objective to protect potential targets against 
all possible risk factors towards enhancing systemic resilience through capability building in 
order to minimize negative impacts in case of attack. It may be more sustainable to decrease 
vulnerabilities and increase the resilience of (economic) systems in general, rather than trying 
to fight a particular cause of insecurity in isolated fashion. 
This concept of security provision is based on the understanding that insecurity and vulner-
ability are two sides of one coin. In other words, the level of both risk and uncertainty is de-
termined not just by the threat per se but also by the degree of systemic vulnerability. Kun-
reuther (2006) builds, e.g., on Beck’s Risk Society (1992) and identifies the current state of 
interdependencies in the economic context as a critical factor of vulnerability. These interde-
pendencies imply that a local event can have global repercussions and as a result, a system of 
interdependent elements and actors is only as secure as its weakest link (cf. Enders and 
Sandler 2006: 104-106). Every actor will decide independently whether to invest in security 
or not; nevertheless, these individual decisions can have severe repercussions on overall secu-Definitions and Concepts 
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rity. As the effectiveness of individual security investments is partly dependent on security 
investments of other agents, the decision to invest in security will depend on the expected 
actions of other agents. Consequently, without appropriate mechanisms to overcome possible 
coordination failures, this situation can lead to sub-optimal levels of security when actors 
(uncertain about the investment behavior of others) decide not to invest in security (Kun-
reuther and Heal 2003).  
A second disincentive to security provision is the partly public good nature of security. Some 
investments into certain types of security will provide benefits to society at large, not just to 
the entity investing in these actions. In contrast, other measures of security retain a private 
good element, which allow the investor to reap all returns from the investment. In the case of 
transnational terrorism, the public-private good dichotomy is most significant at the interna-
tional level. Protective policies aimed at securing a particular country, e.g., against al-Qaeda 
attacks, will benefit only this respective country and the people within its territory. In con-
trast, proactive policies that target the actual terror threat incorporate positive externalities to 
other potential target countries which benefit from the reduced capacity of the terror organiza-
tion without taking action by themselves. This free rider problem is a likely explanation why 
international actors are more inclined to rely on defensive rather than proactive policies when 
addressing transnational terrorism, even though game theoretic models show that coordinated 
action could theoretically bestow higher benefits to all countries (Enders and Sandler 2006). 
2.3 Terrorism 
In this survey, terrorism is defined as “the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal 
violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological 
objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the poli-
cymaking that the terrorists seek to influence” (Enders and Sandler 2002:145). This definition 
has also been used by security economists in Europe such as Tavares (2004) and Brück 
(2006). Nevertheless, this definition has its shortcomings. 
First, it does not reflect the varieties of terrorism that have occurred in history and across 
countries (Hoffman 1998). Thus, such an aggregate definition runs the danger of masking the 
heterogeneity of terrorism and terrorists, their behavior and consequently the impact. It may 
necessary to differentiate between, e.g., large versus small scale attacks; continued versus 
protracted incidences; domestic versus transnational terrorism.2 Such a differentiation be-
tween different types of terrorism is critical as economic impacts of terrorism and the com-
plexity of countermeasures vary, depending on the nature of the terror attack. For instance, 
the issue of transnational terrorism involves the cooperation between at least two countries to 
                                                                          
2 Transnational terrorism denotes an act of terrorism which involves actors and targets from at least two different 
nationalities. Actors could refer to either the terrorists themselves as well as to their wider support structure. Definitions and Concepts 
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tackle the causes and consequences of terrorism, and requires taking into account host and 
target country factors and their interactions that may drive terrorist activity.  
Second, the above definition does not account for the political characteristics of the term 
terrorism: ultimately “every sovereign state reserves to itself the political and legal authority 
to define terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs” (Alexander and Alexander 
2002: 1). As history shows, terrorists have become “freedom fighters” when power shifted 
hands. For the purpose of security economics this can have important repercussions for the 
reliability of data. Especially when data collection is based on government statistics, acts may 
be defined as terrorist, depending on political suitability rather than “objective” criteria, as we 
shall discuss below. 
2.4 Security  economics   
Security economics is understood as those activities affected by, preventing, dealing with and 
mitigating insecurity (including terrorism) in the economy. Such a broad definition includes 
private and public activities in both legal and illegal areas of the economy. Narrower versions 
of this definition (such as a focus on state spending for homeland security or private spending 
for anti-crime devices) may be adopted by other authors for different purposes (Brück 2004: 
376). Security economics further refers to the application of economic tools to analyze the 
origins and dynamics of (in-) security. 
2.5 Methodological  considerations 
There are at least four methodological problems associated with the evaluation of costs and 
benefits of terrorist events and anti-terrorist measures: (i) the problem of double counting; (ii) 
the problem to value non-monetary parameters; (iii) the insufficiency of (potentially biased) 
data; and (iv) general limitations of economics as discipline.  
(i) Double Counting 
Double counting refers to the problem of accounting for the same costs or benefits twice, thus 
arriving at an inflated figure of economic impacts. For instance, when considering the number 
of victims from different forms of terrorism (e.g., bombings, kidnappings, hijackings) there 
may be incidences of double counting when an attack incorporates two or more of these dif-
ferent forms of terrorism (e.g., hijacking of a plane and its subsequent bombing), and the 
victims of this single event are counted for each type of activity separately (i.e., multiple 
times).  
(ii) Non-Monetary Parameters  
Non-monetary parameters refer to a value that has no market price equivalent. For instance, a 
human life or life satisfaction have a value which is not readily quantifiable. Non-monetary 
parameters may also include more tangible economic parameters which are simply not traded Definitions and Concepts 
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in the market and therefore do not have a monetary value. Consequently, accounting for their 
value is often difficult. Approaches to quantifying non-monetary parameters (e.g., the value of 
human life) are summed up, e.g., by Viscusi and Aldy (2003). 
The analysis of the effect of terrorism on non-monetary parameters has also been recognized 
and addressed in the field of security economics, e.g., in Frey et al. (2009). They argue that 
the economic impacts of terrorism are likely to be underestimated as non-monetary losses do 
not appear in statistical databases and are therefore not accounted for. Besides the life satis-
faction approach (e.g., Frey et al. 2009), other methodologies such as contingent valuation3, 
hedonic market pricing4 and conjoint analysis (e.g., Smith et al. 2009) exist which have also 
been applied to the issue of terrorism. 
(iii) Insufficiency of Data 
As the understanding of terrorism and an empirical analysis of its causes and impacts is based 
on reports of actual terror events in the media and by public statistics, the quality of the data 
may negatively impact these analyses. 
First, the problem of an “under-reporting bias” (the tendency not to report a specific event and 
therefore underestimating the frequency of terror) can significantly influence the accuracy of 
security economics. Evidently, democratic countries with a free press tend to report more 
terrorism than countries where the media is controlled, producing an under-reporting bias. For 
instance, not taking into account this bias properly may lead to the conclusion that democratic 
countries are likelier producers of terrorism. However, such an inference may simply be a 
result of the bias that is systematically related to the variables of interest (e.g., Miller 1994; 
Drakos and Gofas 2006a). Leading economists conclude that extant research has fallen short 
from addressing this issue in a systematic fashion, yet underreporting is indeed present, im-
plying that the used databases for terrorism represent an understatement of the true number of 
terrorist incidents (cf. Drakos and Gofas 2006a). 
Second, more generally, given that terrorist organizations work clandestinely, a reporting bias 
may also be a consequence of the very nature of terrorist activity and may not only be rooted 
in certain country-specific characteristics (e.g., freedom of the press). Researchers should be 
aware that existing data sources may suffer from reporting biases and that extracted data may 
be a rather poor proxy for terrorist activity.  
Third, datasets used by empirical researchers may contain specific biases of their accord. 
Certain datasets (e.g., the US State Department reports on terrorism) have been found to in-
clude significant reporting errors (cf. Krueger 2007; Krueger and Laitin 2008). Also, most 
datasets focus on specific kinds of terrorism only (i.e., on transnational terrorism), where such 
a focus may lead to a truncation of the data and to the drawing of wrongful inferences by 
                                                                          
3 Contingent valuation has been applied by, e.g., Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003). 
4 The hedonic market approach is based on the idea that agents reveal their preferences regarding terrorism 
through, e.g., wage and salary demands and real estate prices. Definitions and Concepts 
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making generalizations when looking at specific forms of terrorism only (cf. Sanchez-Cuenca 
and Calle 2009). Drakos (2008) provides an overview of available data sources suitable for an 
economic analysis of terrorist actions, also pointing at existing shortcomings of these sources 
which, e.g., manifest in a focus on specific kinds of terrorism only or general insufficiencies 
of the data collection process, leading to “truncated” information on terrorist activity that is 
not of limited value for the economic analysis of terrorism. 
(iv) General limitations 
Even if economics can provide an additional dimension to evaluate policy choices, in many 
respects it cannot give clear cut answers to certain policy problems. Coughlin et al. (2002:9) 
for example recognize that “economic theory does not provide a clear answer to what is likely 




3 ECONOMICS  OF  INSECURITY – CAUSES OF TERRORISM 
In this section we want to discuss one central question of the economic analysis of terrorism: 
what are the causes of terrorism? To answer this question, we first introduce a basic theoreti-
cal framework which underlies any economic analysis of terrorism roots. Then, we consider 
which kind of terrorism is analyzed on which level. This implies that different kinds of terror-
ism may have different roots, and that individual and aggregate analytical perspectives may 
deliver different results. For our survey, we distinguish between (i) analytical levels (micro 
vs. macro perspective), (ii) geographical levels (case study vs. regional vs. global perspective) 
and (iii) the various kinds of terrorism (transnational vs. domestic; suicide vs. non-suicide 
terrorism).5 
3.1  Explaining the Causes of Terrorism 
Before we discuss the empirical evidence along the aforementioned categories, we first have 
to present a basic theoretical framework for an economic analysis of terrorism causes, focus-
ing on several key assumptions. As stated above, terrorism is commonly defined as the delib-
erate use of violence and intimidation directed at a large audience in order to coerce a com-
munity or its government into conceding politically or ideologically motivated demands. The 
main tactical (short-run) goals of terrorism are (i) gaining publicity and media attention, (ii) 
destabilizing existing polity and (iii) damaging national economies (e.g., Schelling 1991). 
                                                                          
5 Note that in order to avoid repetitions we discuss some empirical evidence that focuses on (Western) Europe in 
Section 7 of this contribution, where we offer a European view on the issue of terrorism. Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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Among the long-run goals of terrorism are a redistribution of power, influence and wealth 
(e.g., Frey and Luechinger 2004). Tactical terrorist behavior (e.g., assassinations, hostage-
takings) serves the purpose of achieving such strategic goals. Terrorist organizations must 
have goals that are not enforceable in the ordinary political process. Violence is thus a means 
to meet more abstract (strategic) objectives.6 
An economic view on terrorism assumes that terrorists are rational actors. The average terror-
ist behaves more or less as a homo economicus, considering their response to incentives, their 
narrow self-interest and the rationality of their expectations (Caplan 2006). As rational actors 
they commit terrorist actions in order to maximize their utility, given certain benefits, costs 
and constraints linked to these actions (e.g., Sandler and Enders 2004). The calculus of terror-
ists includes their marginal benefits and costs. The utility-maximizing level of terrorism is the 
level where the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits of terrorism. Benefits from terror-
ism arise from obtaining the tactical and strategic goals of terrorism. The costs of terrorism 
are linked to e.g. the use of resources and to the opportunity costs of violent behavior (e.g., 
Frey and Luechinger 2004). `Aggregate' factors that are country-specific impact the terrorists' 
cost-benefit matrices and thus their behavior. Such determinants may either raise the price of 
terrorism or the opportunity costs of terrorism, causing a decline in terrorist activity. Alterna-
tively, the price of terrorism, and thus the opportunity costs of terrorism, may be decreased, 
resulting in an increase in violent behavior. The empirical literature on terrorism roots sur-
veyed in the following picks up this idea. 
In general, this literature aims at finding the “roots of terrorism”. Basically, the idea is that 
certain poor or unfavorable conditions morph into violence (terrorism) via the aforementioned 
cost-benefit effects. Here, a central question is whether economic (e.g., poverty) or political 
(e.g., repression) factors are root causes of terrorism. Of course, eventually finding the root 
causes of terrorism should be particularly interesting for counter-terrorism, e.g., when decid-
ing whether to focus on economic or political development. However, while some researchers 
(e.g., Krueger 2007; Krueger and Laitin 2008) argue that political conditions matter clearly 
more to terrorism than economic ones, other studies (as we shall see later) come to less con-
clusive (or contradicting) conclusions. Also, non-economic and non-political factors (e.g., 
ethnic conflict and geography) have also been found to matter to terrorism. That is, the em-
pirical evidence (as we shall discuss later) offers ample support for a number of distinct 
schools of thought emphasizing the relative importance of certain terrorism determinants on 
theoretical grounds. We discuss these schools of thought below. 7 
(1) Some scholars suggest that terrorism is rooted in ‘relative’ economic deprivation (which 
manifests itself, e.g., in poverty, within-country inequality and a lack of economic opportuni-
                                                                          
6 On an individual level, terrorists must exhibit certain character traits (e.g. low cognitive capabilities or the ability 
to overcome moral constraints related to the hurting and killing of others) that enable them to conduct terrorist 
actions; on an organizational level, the dominance of group leaders, group dynamics and other (psychological) 
factors also influence terrorist behavior. See Victoroff (2005) for a review of psychological approaches to terror-
ism. 
7 The discussion here partly draws on Krieger and Meierrieks (2008). Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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ties), where violence is generated when there is a discrepancy between what individuals think 
they deserve and what they actually receive in the course of an economic (distributive) proc-
ess (Gurr 1970). Poor structural economic conditions create frustration, which in turn makes 
violence more likely. In environments where (relative) economic deprivation prevails, terror-
ist organizations should find it easier (less costly) to recruit frustrated followers or to receive 
funding from supporters. The lack of non-violent economic activities may also fill the ranks 
of terrorist organizations by lowering the opportunity costs of violence. 
(2) Others emphasize the role of socio-economic change over long-run socio-economic condi-
tions. They argue that terrorism is fostered by the process of modernization which creates 
different types of strain, e.g., from economic changes, new ideas (e.g., Western ideologies) 
and new forms of living (shift from agricultural to urban societies). All of these factors may 
create grievances associated with economic, demographic or social strain (Robison et al. 
2006). For instance, medical progress changes the patterns of population development, result-
ing in populations with high youth burdens (Ehrlich and Liu 2002). In general, modernization 
is associated with economic, demographic and social changes. Terrorist organizations are able 
to capitalize on the grievances of `modernization losers', thus making recruitment, financing 
or other forms of support more likely. Also, terrorist organizations may use modern means of 
communication to disseminate their opinions more effectively (Ross 1993). Modernization is 
likely to lower the costs of terrorist activity by creating grievances e.g. linked to economic 
dissatisfaction, new forms of alienated living or other challenges to traditional societal pat-
terns. 
(3) The political and institutional order is also argued to be connected to terrorism. There is 
an ongoing academic debate on whether a certain political system (a democratic or autocratic 
regime) is more prepared to deal with terrorism. While the former can offer non-violent 
means of voicing dissent, it is also constrained in its efforts to realize `hard' counter-terrorism 
(e.g., because civil liberties are protected). The latter can capitalize on its capability of `hard' 
repression but may at the same time also generate grievances linked to political disenfran-
chisement. Some authors suggest that semi-open societies (partial democracies) are most 
prone to terrorism because they cannot capitalize on the advantages of either `pure' political 
regime. Regardless of the exact regime type, government strength (e.g., military power), gov-
ernment policies or ideological affiliation may also influence a terrorist's calculus. For in-
stance, a large-scale government may make it more difficult for societal groups to pursue rent-
seeking, making it more attractive to gain rents through terrorist violence (Kirk 1983). Also, if 
the institutional order impedes economic participation (e.g., by means of corruption) it may 
also be more attractive for an individual terrorist to engage in violence. The opportunity costs 
of violence are expected to increase with institutional quality (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006). 
That is, terrorist activity should decrease with higher levels of institutional quality.  
(4) Political transformation and political instability are also sometimes regarded as causes of 
terrorism, in particular in popular discourse. This view argues that political change also mat-
ters to terrorism, regardless of the (long-run) political conditions. Changes in a political sys-Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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tem create political vacuums which terrorist groups can use to push their agendas. First, these 
groups are less likely to be challenged by an instable government which is usually weak, 
making terrorism a less costly venture. Second, an individual may find it more attractive to 
support a radical organization because there are few non-violent alternatives (meaning low 
opportunity costs of violence) but high payoffs from terrorist success (meaning increased 
violence benefits). Third, instable countries may serve as schools of terrorism (Campos and 
Gassebner 2008). In times of domestic instability individuals gain an `education' in violence 
they can also use for internationalized terrorist campaigns. State failure is commonly seen as 
one root cause of terrorism, as it is expected to maximize the promoting effects of instability 
on terrorism. Failed states are seen as safe havens for terrorist organizations (Rotberg 2002). 
(5) Huntington (1996) states that violence is also a consequence of civilizational clash. The 
main idea is that when groups exhibit different identities (e.g., in the sense of different relig-
ions or ethnicity), this leads to more conflict either between different groups within a country 
or between different country groups organized along civilizational lines (e.g., Islamic coun-
tries versus the West). For terrorist groups it should be less costly to muster support against 
antagonistic groups, in particular when terrorist groups build on identity-related ideologies 
that stress the supremacy of their identity (e.g., representing a `chosen people'). Such a world 
view eliminates moral constraints and strengthens an organization's cohesion, thus making 
terrorism less costly and more effective (Bernholz 2006). The abstract conflict between world 
views also becomes manifest in realpolitik, where population groups with different identities 
pursue different (often diametrical) policies. Such behavior may, e.g., be represented in rent-
seeking or other forms of social interaction between groups with different identities (Arce and 
Sandler 2003). Terrorism is used by the inferior group not only as a means to voice their 
world view but also to shift (material) outcomes in their favor. Identity (and opposition to 
other identities) works as a bond facilitating, e.g., terrorist recruitment and financial support. 
(6) Economic and political integration is also sometimes linked to terrorism. On the one hand, 
this view transfers the idea that terrorism is rooted in socio-economic change and conditions 
to the global arena. That is, if individuals are incited by an existing global order (e.g., the 
existing global distribution of wealth) that is perceived as `unfair', it should be easier for ter-
rorist organizations to find support by building on related grievances. Then, terrorism is used 
as a political tool by the poor and disenfranchised, being a cost-efficient means to voice dis-
content. 
On the other hand, economic globalization may also have specific effects on terrorism. For 
instance, increased trade openness may lower the costs of transportation and cross-border 
activities for terrorists, thus contributing to increased terrorist activity (e.g., Mirza and Verdier 
2008). 
Furthermore, international politics (political integration) may also enter the terrorists’ calcu-
lus. Here, foreign policy, alliance structures and foreign dominance (Western or US suprem-
acy), may incite terrorist activity (cf. Lizardo and Bergesen 2004). For instance, a conflict Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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between a government and an opposing group may be exported to a foreign ally of the gov-
ernment; the Israeli-Palestine conflict which has e.g. triggered Palestine terrorist activity in 
Europe may serve as an example (Addison and Murshed 2005). In times of global changes 
(e.g., hegemonic decline) terrorism is also anticipated to become more likely (Bergesen and 
Lizardo 2004). Here, e.g., punishment for terrorist activity becomes less probable (i.e. costs of 
terrorism decrease) and radical views can be more easily voiced and enforced in times of 
global instability and insecurity (i.e., the potential payoffs increase, while the costs of terror-
ism decrease). 
However, international economic and political factors do not need to automatically generate 
violence. For instance, if political integration ameliorates the international distribution of 
wealth and power, it may reduce terrorist support as globalization grievances are reduced. 
Similarly, if economic integration benefits the poor by stimulating economic development 
(e.g., through gains from trade), it may reduce terrorist support as non-violence becomes more 
attractive (Li and Schaub 2004). So while a globalization-terrorism nexus may very well ex-
ist, the exact mechanics of this nexus remain somewhat disputed. 
 (7) Lastly, contagion may be another factor explaining terrorism. Terrorism exhibits a strong 
self-energizing nature with respect to both time and space (Midlarsky et al. 1980).8 First, past 
terrorism bears new terrorism within one country (temporal contagion). For a terrorist organi-
zation it is more beneficial to run a terrorist campaign because this increases the benefits from 
terrorist activity (e.g., by making oneself heard through increased media attention). Second, if 
one country suffers from terrorism, it may infect other countries in its neighborhood (spatial 
contagion). For instance, emerging terrorist groups may capitalize on the experience of older 
groups in adjacent countries. Additionally, when terrorist organizations cooperate they may 
also reduce their costs (e.g., by sharing know-how) or increase their payoffs (e.g., by joint 
terrorist actions). Spatial and temporal proximity to terrorism thus already influences the cost-
benefit considerations of terrorists in ways that may promote the generation of violence. 
3.2 Micro-economic  analyses 
Some studies try to gain information about the causes of terrorism by analyzing individual 
behavior, e.g. by means of interviews of potential or captured terrorists. Several studies ex-
plicitly investigate the roots of Palestinian terrorism. While such a micro approach is surely 
helpful to understand individual behavior (answering the question why an individual becomes 
a terrorist), a generalization of related results and their transfer to the macro level of analysis 
is difficult (bearing in mind the relationship of micro and macro levels of analysis and the risk 
of ecological fallacies). Nevertheless, such micro approach may be helpful to provide ‘micro 
                                                                          
8 We may also think of contagion that is a consequence of terrorist success. For instance, a successful attack 
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foundations’ associated to macroeconomic explanations of terrorist activity (which are far 
more common and will be discussed later). 
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) provide an analysis which focuses on the connections be-
tween poverty, education and terrorist activity in the Israeli-Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflict 
(e.g., lone-wolf terrorism by Israelis and participation in Hezbollah). In general, their findings 
suggest that on an individual level violent activity is not correlated with poor economic condi-
tions or low levels of education. By contrast, higher income and better education seem to 
promote participation in terrorist activity (as does a young age). Krueger and Maleckova 
(2003) argue that this is a consequence of an increased interest in politics that is associated 
with better education and a privileged background. Also, a better education of potential terror-
ists makes it more likely for them to be successful, making them more attractive recruits for 
terrorist activity. This argumentation can also be found in Bueno de Mesquita (2005). 
Focusing on a similar field of analysis (i.e., Palestine terrorist activity), Berrebi (2007) also 
finds that higher education and standard of living make it more likely for an individual to join 
a Palestine terrorist organization. By contrast, being married reduces this likelihood. Berrebi 
(2007) argues that the positive link between education and terrorism on a micro level may 
have to do more with the content of education (which is shown to often resemble indoctrina-
tion) than with the amount of education (e.g., years of schooling).  
Krueger (2008) who analyzes the background of homegrown Islamic terrorist in the US finds 
that these alleged terrorists are well-educated compared to their non-violent counterparts: He 
also stresses the role of education (i.e., years of schooling) and young age in predicting terror-
ist activity, while a specific cultural background (e.g., an Arabic one) does not seem to matter 
strongly. 
In general, being of young age and not being married makes it more likely to become a terror-
ist. More interestingly, existing micro evidence indicates that education matters to terrorism in 
ways that are in contrast to popular wisdom. The same holds for the (negligible) impact of 
poverty on terrorist activity. As existing micro evidence is sparse and focuses strongly on the 
Israeli-Palestine (Arab-Israeli) conflict, it is difficult to come to a general conclusion. It seems 
that on organizational levels it is more beneficial to recruit educated (or at least strongly in-
doctrinated) individuals, as they are more likely to be politically motivated and successful in 
executing terrorist actions (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 2005). A positive correlation between 
high education and high income may explain why poverty does not matter to terrorist recruit-
ment on individual levels (given that individual abilities may lead to higher education, thus 
higher income and also a higher attractiveness for terrorist organizations). As we shall see 
later, the ‘micro’ findings are supported by some scholars with a ‘macro view’ of the issue of 
terrorism roots, where related studies also finds no strong links between education, poverty 
and terrorism. Considering the aforementioned schools of thought on terrorism roots (which 
are more strongly related to a ‘macro view’ of the issue) it is difficult to connect to the ‘micro 
view’ and its results. At best, it seems as if modernization which manifests itself in education Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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(and in particular in educational content which conveys resentments against modernization) is 
connected to terrorist participation on individual levels. 
3.3  Macro-economic view: Case study and region-specific evidence  
3.3.1 Case  studies 
The first studies taking an aggregate (macro) view on the determinants of terrorism reviewed 
here are case studies. These studies focus on one country only. On the one hand, such analy-
ses are helpful in assessing the roots of conflict in this very country, also allowing for com-
parisons with the general results from global studies on terrorism determinants. On the other 
hand, they are not very helpful in creating such generalized results. Naturally, case studies 
focus on countries strongly affected by terrorist violence (i.e., by long-run terrorist cam-
paigns). 
Algeria has suffered from terrorism by Islamic groups (e.g., by the Armed Islamic Group) in 
particular since the 1990s. Testas (2001) argues that economic decline has initiated this con-
flict. Although Testas (2001) does not deny the impact of religious (Islamic influence) and 
political (lack of democracy) factors in swaying civil conflict, he argues that not until the 
beginning of the economic decline in the 1980s Islamic movements were able to gain substan-
tial popular support. Thus, Testas (2001) gives support to the economic deprivation hypothe-
sis, arguing that economic factors have been central for explaining terrorist violence in Alge-
ria. 
Sri Lanka has suffered from terrorist violence conducted by insurgent groups such as the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam since its independence in 1948. Samaranayake (1999) also 
links the violence in Sri Lanka to economic factors, arguing that slow growth, youth unem-
ployment and inflation have laid the ground for civil unrest. Modernization has also played a 
role: Population growth, urbanization and the emergence of modern forms of education and 
mass media have led to societal changes that have not been absorbed by the existing political 
and economic system. Furthermore, ethnic conflict (between the Sinhalese majority and the 
Tamil minority) has contributed to the generation of violence. Thus, for Samaranayake (1999) 
in general a variety of economic and non-economic factors has contributed to the ongoing 
civil conflict in Sri Lanka. 
In Turkey, terrorist violence has been conducted by leftist and certain ethnic groups (e.g., by 
the PKK). Feridun and Sezgin (2008) argue that terrorist violence has at least to some part 
been motivated by economic causes. In their analysis regional economic underdevelopment is 
one factor that contributes to the genesis of terrorism in Turkey, again giving support for 
hypotheses that link terrorism to economic factors. 
Lastly, Israel has had a history of political violence since its independence, where violence 
has originated from extremist Israeli and Palestine groups (e.g. the early PLO or Hamas). Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
  18
Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) focus on the spatial and temporal determinants of terrorism in 
Israel, looking for support of the contagion hypothesis of terrorism. In their analysis, they find 
that space and time are indeed important for explaining the patterns of terrorism in Israel. 
Locations that are accessible for terrorists (e.g. as they are near to their home bases) are more 
frequently attacked because the (travelling) costs of such attacks are comparatively low. Time 
also matters, as the frequency of attacks may serve as a risk signal for potential terrorists. 
In general, existing case study evidence focuses on countries that suffer heavily from terrorist 
violence. In many cases, economic and political underdevelopment coupled with ethnic con-
flict seems to matter to explaining the emergence of violence. However, these results are not 
suitable for generalization. This may be regarded as a major shortcoming of case study evi-
dence. Still, the results of such studies allow for the derivation of adequate policy solutions 
for the countries analyzed. 
3.3.2 Region-specific  evidence 
A few other studies investigate the determinants of terrorism in certain world regions, again 
using macro variables. While these studies are able to provide a general picture for the respec-
tive region on which they focus, they are (like case studies) unable to provide a global per-
spective on terrorism roots. 
For Latin America the study by Feldmann and Perälä (2004) suggests that non-economic 
factors are more important than economic ones. In their analysis economic variables (eco-
nomic growth, income inequality etc.) do not share a significant association with terrorism. 
However, terrorist attacks are more likely in regions with poor institutions and relative politi-
cal underdevelopment, where attacked countries are characterized by, e.g., human right viola-
tions or a weak rule of law. Feldmann and Perälä (2004) thus provide support for hypotheses 
that link the likelihood of terrorism more closely to the political and institutional than to the 
(domestic) economic order. 
For the Middle East as another region plagued by terrorism, Piazza (2007) provides an em-
pirical analysis. He finds that political stability and other political factors matter strongly to 
terrorism production and attack patterns. For this world region more liberal (i.e., less auto-
cratic) countries are more likely to be attacked by terrorist groups. What is more, countries 
experiencing episodes of state failure (i.e., of major political instability) are significantly more 
likely to be attacked by or to host terrorism. At least for this part of the world the results by 
Piazza (2007) imply that hypotheses emphasizing the role of the political order and of politi-
cal stability trump others which focus on the economy or international factors. However, 
political instability may be closely related to economic failure and to ethnically or religiously 
motivated conflict; thus, the results of Piazza (2007) may be, at least partially, driven by such 
correlations. Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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The study by Testas (2004) focuses on another country club, namely Muslim countries.9 His 
results indicate that economic factors (i.e., per capita income) are not strongly connected with 
terrorism, whereas political factors are. More precisely, there is a non-linear relationship be-
tween a country’s level of political repression and the likelihood of terrorist activity, suggest-
ing a non-trivial connection between the political order and terrorism for this country club. As 
in Piazza (2007), the existence of civil wars (i.e. of extreme political instability and state fail-
ure) is positively connected with terrorism, again relating terrorism closely to political insta-
bility. Also, the results of Testas (2004) suggest that education is a positive determinant of 
terrorism. This may give support to hypotheses that link demographic features (e.g., educa-
tion) to terrorism because they influence a terrorist organization’s calculus. For instance, 
better education means a higher rate of success of terrorism, so education may be positively 
connected to terrorism. However, connecting education to terrorism in this way may go along 
with potential ecological fallacies. 
As with the case study evidence, empirical studies on terrorism roots for certain world regions 
are rare. Also, they are not able to provide complete (global) pictures of terrorism determi-
nants. For Latin America, the Middle East and the club of Muslim countries, non-economic 
(political and institutional) factors appear to matter more strongly to terrorism than economic 
ones. Also, political instability seems to fuel the emergence of terrorism and terrorist attacks. 
This evidence supports views arguing that political and institutional factors enter a terrorist’s 
calculus, e.g., by providing a cost-efficient means of voicing dissent in the face of political 
repression. 
3.4 Macro-economic  view:  cross-country evidence 
The majority of empirical studies have tried to establish global results for terrorism determi-
nants by using large country samples which are not restricted to one world region or country 
club. These studies may focus on specific kinds of terrorism (transnational vs. domestic;. 
suicide vs. non-suicide terrorism). They may also (in the case of transnational terrorism) focus 
either on the country of origin of the perpetrators of transnational terrorism or on its targets. 
Given that most datasets available only provide information on transnational terrorism, this 
kind of terrorism has been in the center of interest.10 
3.4.1  Origins of Transnational Terrorism 
As discussed earlier, transnational terrorism is a form of terrorism that involves more than one 
country through a variety of possible connections (e.g., as terrorist groups consist of members 
                                                                          
9 Testas (2004) includes all the countries of Piazza (2007) in his sample, with the exceptions being Israel, Libya 
and Lebanon. Testas (2004) furthermore includes Muslim countries outside the Middle East in his sample (e.g., 
Chad, Pakistan, and Indonesia). 
10 For a more detailed review of the causes of terrorism, see the review by Krieger and Meierrieks (2008) on 
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from different countries or because a domestic terrorist group purposefully targets foreigners). 
Empirical studies which investigate the origins of transnational terrorism center on the condi-
tions in the countries from which terrorists originate, regardless of the eventual targets of 
these terrorists. We review the existing evidence on the origins of transnational terrorism with 
regard to the aforementioned global hypotheses on terrorism roots that connect terrorism to 
economic factors (e.g., poverty or socio-economic modernization), politics and institutions 
(e.g., regime type or political instability), demography (e.g., education or ethnic conflict), 
political and economic globalization (e.g., trade or foreign aid) and spatial and temporal con-
tagion. 
The study by Blomberg and Hess (2008a) provides evidence that high income reduces the 
likelihood of a country to generate terrorism. This result and similar ones in Azam and Dela-
croix (2006) and Lai (2007) seem to suggest that economic factors matter to the global pro-
duction of transnational terrorism. However, there are a number of other studies (e.g. Krueger 
and Maleckova 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006; Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2007; 
Krueger and Laitin 2008) that do not find a significant relationship between short-run (e.g., 
growth) and structural economic conditions and the genesis of transnational terrorism. That is, 
there is no clear evidence linking economic deprivation (low income) and economic change to 
the production of terrorism. 
Evidently, political and institutional conditions may also matter to terrorism. A study by Pi-
azza (2008b) finds that political instability and state failure make it more likely for a country 
to host transnational terrorist groups. Burgoon (2006) shows that welfare policies are associ-
ated with a reduction in terrorism production, presumably by leveling economic disparities 
which may otherwise lead to discontent and violence. Political repression may also be associ-
ated with terrorism production (e.g., Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Krueger and Laitin 2008). 
In repressive political systems terrorism may be seen as a cost-effective way of voicing dis-
sent and achieving political changes. However, it is by now unclear whether this relationship 
is strictly linear (so that repressive countries produce terrorism while liberal ones do not). As 
found by Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), the relationship between political openness and ter-
rorism may also be non-linear (so that semi-open countries produce most terrorism). 
In either case, it is clear that when studies control carefully for non-economic (political and 
institutional) factors the impact of economic factors on terrorism production becomes less 
pronounced. This may be a consequence of the close connection between economic and non-
economic factors (the effect of political instability on the economy may serve as an example). 
Besides the aforementioned ongoing discussion whether terrorism production can be de-
scribed as a process driven by economic or political factors, a variety of other potential de-
terminants has also been investigated. Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2007) provide evidence 
that terrorism is rooted in ethnic conflict. Such conflict may be about the distribution of 
power, wealth and other resources along ethnic lines, making violence (terrorism) along these 
very lines likely. This study can be regarded as a support for the civilizational clash theory of Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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terrorism. Furthermore, conflicting evidence argues that education is (Azam and Thelen 2008) 
or is not (Krueger and Maleckova 2003) associated with terrorism. From these studies it re-
mains unclear whether education is a determinant of terrorism (e.g., through the so-called 
socio-economic modernization channel) on a global scale and what the direction of influence 
of related variables is. 
Further evidence empirically demonstrates links between economic globalization, interna-
tional political factors and terrorism production. Here, Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) find that 
increased economic integration (increased trade openness) may scale down the risk of terror-
ism production, arguing that economic integration may create economic gains that make vio-
lence less attractive. Evidently, the global economic order may also influence the calculus of 
potential terrorists and their supporters. Focussing on the international political order, the 
results of Azam and Delacroix (2006) and Azam and Thelen (2008) suggest that foreign aid 
may reduce the likelihood of a country to produce terrorism. These studies argue that foreign 
aid may reduce terrorism by promoting education and economic development, thus increasing 
the opportunity costs of violence. Thus, these studies suggest that the international political 
order may not only be considered as threatening and thus terror-enhancing. However, as 
Neumayer and Plümper (2009) argue, dependence on foreign aid may create terrorism against 
donor countries when foreign aid is used to stabilize otherwise weak regimes. Here, the stra-
tegic logic of terrorists is to weaken domestic regimes by attacking the donor country in the 
hope of cutting support for the domestic regime. The latter finding may indicate that the use 
of foreign aid matters to the mechanics through which aid (as an international political factor) 
and terrorism interact. 
In general, evidence on the origins of transnational terrorism is substantial but no conclusive. 
While some (e.g., Krueger and Laitin, 2008) strongly argue that political factors trump over 
economic ones, the related discussion has not been settled by the existing evidence. Currently, 
the production of terrorism appears to be a complex phenomenon potentially driven by a vari-
ety of factors. Thus, existing evidence provides support for several hypotheses which link 
terrorism production to economic deprivation, political underdevelopment and instability, 
demographic struggles and the global (economic and political) order. Because several factors 
may not only determine terrorist activity but may also be dependent upon other potential ter-
rorism determinants, future research is necessary to reveal, if possible, the “true” or “deep” 
determinants of the genesis of transnational terrorism.11 
                                                                          
11 As mentioned before, political instability and economic decline may not only determine terrorism but instability 
may also affect decline and vice versa. Similarly, ethnic conflict may cause slow growth and vice versa. Again, 
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3.4.2  Targets of Transnational Terrorism 
A number of further studies do not center on the origins of transnational terrorism but on its 
targets. That is, these analyses try to answer the question why certain countries are more 
likely to become terrorism victims than others.12 
Similar to the origin so transnational terrorism, the evidence tells no convincing story as to 
whether economic or non-economic (political) factors are more important to the attack pat-
terns of transnational terrorism. On the one hand, there are studies which suggest that eco-
nomic success (e.g., high income or growth rates) make a country a likelier target of terrorism 
(e.g., Tavares 2004; Blomberg et al. 2004b; Blomberg and Hess 2008a, 2008b; Krueger and 
Laitin 2008). Such evidence seems to suggest that the global economic order (global income 
disparities) fuel the discontent of the perceived losers of this order which direct their anger at 
the globalization winners, using terrorism as a cost-efficient means of expressing their anger. 
On the other hand, there are empirical analyses which find no substantial connection between 
terrorism and economic conditions (e.g., Li und Schaub 2004; Li 2005; Piazza 2006; Dreher 
und Gassebner 2008). 
Again it can be argued that once empirical studies do not only control for the influence of 
economic factors on terrorist attack patterns but also for non-economic ones, the effect of 
economic conditions on terrorism becomes less pronounced. For instance, the studies by 
Campos and Gassebner (2008) and Piazza (2008a, 2008b) suggest that political instability is 
an important factor that makes a country a more attractive target for terrorism, e.g. as the costs 
of terrorist attacks (in the form of potential governmental punishment) decrease in the absence 
of a strong state. Further analyses suggest that institutional factors such as government ideol-
ogy (Koch and Cranmer, 2007) or social spending (Burgoon, 2006) are systematically related 
to the attack patterns of terrorism. Also there are studies such as Eyerman (1998), Eubank and 
Weinberg (2001), Li (2005), Piazza (2006), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) and Krueger and 
Laitin (2008) which find a significant relationship between the political and institutional order 
of a country and the likelihood of it being attacked. Still, there is no clear evidence whether 
more repressive or more liberal countries are more prone to attacks, or whether the relation-
ship between political factors and terrorist attacks is non-linear. That is, we cannot assess (as 
with the origins of transnational terrorism) in which way the political order effects the terror-
ist’s calculus. On the one hand, liberalism may make it easier (less costly) for terrorist groups 
to operate as a government is restricted in its counter-terrorism actions by various laws. On 
the other hand, attacks may become less likely as dissent may be voiced more easily by means 
of democratic participation (changing the opportunity costs of violence).13 
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Furthermore, there are studies which suggest that demographic and international political 
factors also matter. For instance, in Drakos and Gofas (2006b) demographic stress in the form 
of a high population density increases the likelihood of an attack. Also, ethnic conflict is 
again found to be a determinant of terrorist attacks (e.g., Piazza 2006). An interesting analysis 
by Dreher and Gassebner (2008) suggests that political proximity to the US leads to more 
terrorist strikes, suggesting that the global political order matters to attack decisions by terror-
ist groups. Finally, the evidence provided by Braithwaite and Li (2007) shows that spatial 
proximity to terrorism hot spots makes it more likely for a country to be attacked by terror-
ism. This supports the contagion hypothesis of terrorism which postulates that spatial or tem-
poral proximity to terrorism makes terrorism more likely as its costs decrease (e.g., through 
network and learning effects) while its benefits simultaneously increase (e.g., as extended 
terrorist campaigns guarantee media attention). Drakos and Gofas (2006b) report a similar 
connection, also suggesting that temporal contagion exists as well. 
To sum up, existing evidence is not uniform with respect to the determinants of transnational 
terrorist attacks. Similar to the origin of transnational terrorism, it is unclear whether eco-
nomic factors are strong determinants or whether they are only closely related to the “true” 
determinants of such attacks (e.g., political instability, state failure, political proximity to the 
US) and therefore become insignificant once empirical studies also control for such “true” 
factors. Currently, evidence on the attack venues seems to indicate that they are influenced by 
a number of economic and non-economic factors, suggesting that terrorist attacks are not 
driven by a few root causes only. An interesting avenue of future research may be to isolate 
the “true” determinants of terrorist attacks more rigorously. Currently, several hypotheses on 
terrorism are supported by the empirical evidence, suggesting that a variety of factors may 
potentially enter the terrorists’ calculus. 
3.4.3 Domestic  Terrorism 
Domestic terrorism is a more common phenomenon than transnational terrorism. Enders and 
Sandler (2008) note that there are eight times more domestic than there are transnational ter-
rorist acts. Nevertheless, there have been only few studies on the roots of domestic terrorism. 
On the one hand, this is a consequence of the nature of this kind of terrorism. It usually gets 
less (international) media attention than transnational terrorism as it is mainly used to express 
domestic dissent, e.g., related to ethno-religious tensions. On the other hand, only recently 
databases have become available which explicitly include acts of domestic terrorism, mainly 
the  Global Terrorism Database (LaFree and Dugan 2006) and the Terrorism in Western 
Europe: Events Data set by Engene (2007). Other datasets focus solemnly on transnational 
terrorism, for instance the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events or ITERATE 
set (e.g., Mickolus et al. 2004) and others (cf. Enders and Sandler 2008). 
Because of the scarcity of the evidence we cannot make any clear conclusions about the roots 
of domestic terrorism yet. The results of Sambanis (2008) suggest that per capita income Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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insignificantly discourages domestic terrorism, while there is a weakly significant and nega-
tive link between religious fractionalization and the occurrence of this kind of terrorism. Also, 
it is found that population size is positively connected with terrorism. The results of Blomberg 
and Hess (2008b) suggest that higher incomes impede domestic terrorism substantially in 
low- and high-income economies. However, both studies only analyze very narrow time peri-
ods and report their results on domestic terrorism rather in the form of robustness results. 
Krieger and Meierrieks (2009) and Gries et al. (2009) make use of the GTD and TWEED 
dataset to analyze the determinants of domestic terrorism specifically for Western Europe. 
The findings of Krieger and Meierrieks (2009) suggest that social welfare policies help to 
discourage domestic terrorism as in Burgoon (2006) and that higher income is also negatively 
related to less domestic terrorism as in Blomberg and Hess (2008b). The results of Gries et al. 
(2009) show that economic performance (economic growth) is a significant determinant of 
domestic terrorism in several Western European countries but is not associated with terrorism 
for other countries of the sample. 
While informative, existing evidence on the genesis of domestic terrorism is very rare and at 
times region-specific. By now, some evidence indicates that economic success reduces the 
likelihood of domestic terrorism, so economic factors seem to matter. Higher income (or the 
leveling of economic disparities by welfare policies) may make non-violent activities more 
attractive and may reduce grievances associated with relative economic deprivation. Conse-
quently, domestic terrorism becomes less likely. However, evidence for non-economic deter-
minants of domestic terrorism is rare and inconclusive, so future research may help to validate 
the early evidence. This research may build on recently available (open-source) datasets of 
domestic terrorism. One interesting avenue of this research may be the (non-)detection of 
differences between the roots of domestic and transnational terrorism. 
3.4.4 Suicide  Terrorism 
Lastly, we want to review some studies which explicitly look at the determinants of suicide 
terrorism. As suggested by Harrison (2006a), suicide terrorism, while looking irrational at 
first sight, may still be considered as the outcome of individual rational choice. While an 
economic analysis of suicide terrorism may thus be justified, there is still an ongoing discus-
sion whether suicide terrorism has specific roots or whether it has not. It may be the case that 
a suicide terrorism campaign is a form of terrorism in particular used against democratic re-
gimes because there are more likely to give in to terrorist demands, facing such a drastic form 
of terrorism (Pape 2003). However, the findings of Wade and Reiter (2007) do not suggest 
that democratic regimes are more likely to face suicide terrorism. Rather, their findings show 
that past experience with suicide terrorism on national and global scales (i.e., in the form of 
suicide terrorism campaigns) more strongly helps to explain the occurrence of suicide terror-
ism, offering support for the idea of suicide terrorism contagion. The results of Wade and 
Reiter (2007) are also supported by Moghadam (2006) who gives a detailed critique of Pape’s Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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(2003) ideas that regime type and factors like foreign occupation are strong determinants of 
suicide attacks. Similarly, Piazza (2008c) shows that a groups ideological affiliation is a 
stronger determinant of using suicide terrorism than political surroundings, finding that 
groups with abstract (e.g., religious) goals are more likely to use this kind of terrorism than 
groups with domestic (concrete) aims. However, the study by Piazza (2008c) also finds that 
suicide terrorists are more likely to come from non-democracies and are also more likely to 
utilize suicide terrorism in the face of foreign occupation. This suggests that political (institu-
tional) matter more strongly to the production of suicide terrorism than to its target decisions. 
Finally, Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) find that education is positively associated with sui-
cide terrorism, meaning that better educated individuals are more likely to be recruited from 
terrorist groups because they are anticipated to be more successful in carrying out their at-
tacks. 
As with the study of domestic terrorism, suicide terrorism has not been investigated exhaus-
tively. While the phenomenon may be analyzed on economic grounds, it is unclear whether it 
is used in specific environments (meaning that it has different determinants than other forms 
of terrorism). Currently, little evidence indicates that certain political regimes are more prone 
to suicide attacks. However, other institutional and political factors as well as contagion may 
matter to the production of suicide terrorism and the choice of its targets. Here, we can find 
little difference to the genesis of other forms of terrorism and its targets. While the existing 
evidence does not indicate that suicide terrorism is rooted in other socio-economic or political 
environments than domestic or transnational terrorism, the study by Piazza (2008c) indicates 
that group ideology matters to the decision to use suicide terrorism. This may add to the ob-
servation by Robison et al. (2006) that groups with certain ideologies are motivated by dis-
tinct determinants. Potentially, group ideology not only predicts which factors offer signifi-
cant incentives to produce terrorism or to attack; it may also predict the mode of the attack. 
3.5 Summary 
In this section, we reviewed the theoretical and empirical (economic) literature on the deter-
minants of terrorism. An economic analysis of terrorism always implies that terrorists are 
rational actors who are influenced in their decisions to commit terrorist acts by a certain set of 
factors (determinants) impacting on their cost-benefit matrices. This basic idea allows for the 
formulation of several global hypotheses emphasizing the relative importance of certain of 
these factors. We presented these hypotheses and their underlying (economic) mechanisms. 
Then we reviewed the empirical evidence in order to assess which hypotheses match the real-
ity best. 
We explicitly distinguished between results taking different analytical perspectives. That is, 
we looked at micro and macro evidence, and at studies which focus on different forms of 
terrorism (origins and targets of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, suicide terror-
ism). In short, even after this (necessary) differentiation our extensive review showed that Economics of Insecurity – Causes of Terrorism 
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there is no “one size fits all” result when it comes to the identification of terrorism causes. 
One may conclude that the evidence on transnational terrorism tends to suggest that transna-
tional terrorism originates in politically underdeveloped countries and is directed at advanced 
and successful economies, as Krueger and Laitin (2008) argue. However, there is conflicting 
evidence on this issue (i.e., the relative importance of economic and non-economic factors in 
terrorism) and no study has ever attempted to control for all factors potentially influencing 
terrorism at once. Furthermore, different possible determinants of terrorism do not only inter-
act with terrorism but also interact with each other. Related issues with causality and interac-
tions may plague the robustness of empirical analyses, and future research should take such 
issues into account. 
This also leads to a more general notion about the causal relationship between terrorism and 
several of its supposed determinants. For instance, while it seems intuitive that poor economic 
conditions (partially) cause terrorism, there may also be a negative effect of terrorism on 
economic development (as we shall see in the next section). This means that the problem of 
reverse causation should be accounted for properly. Here, some studies use instrumental vari-
able approaches (e.g., Abadie 2006) to avoid this problem. Others (e.g., Gries et al. 2009) 
directly test for causation between terrorism and its determinants. However, most studies 
simply assume a fixed causal relationship and only superficially control for causation (i.e., by 
lagging independent variables one period behind the dependent one). Future research should 
take the issue of causality more into account. 
Future research should also more extensively try to cover the rarely investigated forms of 
domestic and suicide terrorism. Currently, the evidence allows for no concrete statement on 
the causes of domestic and suicide terrorism. Also, we cannot assess whether the causes of 
transnational terrorism differ from the ones of domestic and suicide terrorism. Another ave-
nue of future research may be the study of the micro foundations of terrorism and their con-
nection with the macro view. By now, some evidence suggests that income and education are 
positively related to individual participation in terrorist groups. However, this evidence is 
strongly related to certain kinds of conflict (e.g., the Arab-Israeli conflict) and kinds of terror-
ism (e.g., Islamic terrorism). This leaves a number of interesting research questions unan-
swered. 
Existing evidence seems to tell the story that terrorism is driven by numerous factors and is 
thus a complex phenomenon which cannot be sensibly explained by one root cause only. 
These differences in results may be explained on empirical grounds. That is, empirical analy-
ses use different methodologies and different datasets. Empirical results also differ with dif-
ferent levels of analysis, different geographical focuses and different perspectives as regards 
to content (i.e., different dependent variables). Future research may try to use new analytical 
perspectives to broaden the evidence.14 
                                                                          
14 For instance, Abadie (2006) uses a terrorism risk variable instead of distinguishing between domestic and 
transnational terrorism as his dependent variable. His results suggest that political transition matters more 
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The use of different (and large) datasets that cover large time horizons also produces a prob-
lem that is connected to the so-called wave theory of terrorism (e.g., Rapoport 2004). This 
theory argues that the world has been hit by four distinct waves of terrorism in the past, where 
each wave has been associated with a distinct era and ideology.15 While the studies assessing 
the roots of terrorism implicitly assume that the effect of terrorism determinants (e.g., pov-
erty) is constant over time, it may very well be the case that the effect of the determinants 
changes with one wave of terrorism being replaced by another. Future research may take this 
into account by more properly accounted for specific waves of terrorism and associated ideo-
logical backgrounds (cf. Robison et al. 2006). 
Given that we by now cannot assess which “root causes” of terrorism are dominant, our re-
view of the evidence currently does not allow us to reject any of the global hypotheses on 
terrorism causes. This finding has some (obvious) implications for sound counter-terrorism 
advice, as we will discuss later. 
 
                                                                          
guishes between different terrorist group ideologies when assembling a dependent variable in order to analyze 
whether certain groups with distinct ideologies are motivated by distinct determinants. Their results indeed sug-
gest that leftist groups are incited by other determinants than Islamic groups. A further categorization of terrorist 
groups along ideological lines may help to further unveil which ‘macro’ determinants matter to which kind of 
terrorism. 
15 Rapaport (2004) identifies an anarchist wave in the late 19
th century, an anti-colonial wave beginning in the 
1920s, a leftist wave lasting till the late 1970s and a religious wave starting in 1979. Shughart (2006) argues 
similarly. 
 
4 ECONOMICS  OF  INSECURITY – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
TERRORISM 
Direct economic impacts of terrorism refer to the effects arising from the immediate aftermath 
of a terrorist event. Estimating these impacts requires accounting for the physical destruction 
of buildings and infrastructure and losses of human life or capabilities (through injury) but 
also for the economic impacts resulting from actions to mitigate damages. Furthermore, in an 
interdependent economic system, terrorist strikes causes the disruption of economic activities 
which may feed through even to economic entities which have not been direct targets of the 
attack; that is, terrorism may also produce considerable but indirect effects. Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
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4.1 Micro-economic  impacts 
Before assessing the aggregate impacts at the macro-economic level, micro-economic proc-
esses which determine the overall macro-economic effects need to be considered. At the most 
basic, it is possible to differentiate between three main types of economic actors, namely 
households (or consumers), the private sector (or producers), and the public sector (or the 
government). As discussed before, depending on their involvement in a terrorist attack, eco-
nomic agents may suffer from (i) direct impacts through losses in physical and human capital, 
and (ii) indirect impacts that emerge as consequence of the distortion of the economy. At the 
same time, they themselves may influence the economy through their immediate responses to 
the violent shock that occurred. Thus, apart from the actual costs, it is necessary to understand 
the underlying processes and behavior which lead to these impacts, all based on the notion 
that appropriate management of a post-attack situation could potentially mitigate negative 
impacts.  
Direct economic losses of terrorism have reached new dimensions considering the unprece-
dented magnitude of 9/11. Therefore, it is not surprising that the core of the literature focuses 
on this event as a special case. The destruction that took place includes physical and human 
losses which by far exceed the average scale of terrorist attacks: Human losses amounted to 
over 3,000 lives lost (including office workers, aircraft passengers and hundreds of rescue 
personnel), excluding the unaccounted number of people who suffered temporary and perma-
nent injury, who experienced health problems caused by air pollution from the collapse of the 
buildings, not to mention the severe trauma and psychological impacts on these victims and 
their families.  
Various studies have attempted to compute the actual costs resulting from these losses. In 
general, the estimations of human and capital costs of 9/11 range between US$ 25 and 60 
billion. Navarro and Spence (2001) estimate that human capital losses alone account for US$ 
40 billion while property losses ranged “only” between US$ 10 and 13 billion. This estimate 
is similar to Baily’s estimate (Baily 2001), yet is somewhat lower than the cost calculations of 
the OECD (Lenain et al. 2002). Furthermore, rescue and clean-up operations have been esti-
mated at US$ 11 billion. Of these aggregate costs, it has been estimated that 14 billion US 
accrued to the private sector, 1.5 billion US for state and local government enterprises, 0.7 
billion US for the US federal government. Estimated figures differ depending on whether 
human losses have been incorporated into the calculation and due to various accounting prob-
lems, such as differences in definitions of damage, measurement of losses used, aggregation 
issues, but especially the difficulty to value a human life (Brück and Wickström 2004). 
Yet, 9/11 is certainly an outlier with regard to the physical damage and human fatalities it 
caused, compared, e.g., to the majority of predominately separatist terrorist attacks that have 
been experienced in Europe. Apart from its scale, two other key differences between 9/11 and 
“conventional” terror attacks prevail: firstly, recent transnational terror attacks can be charac-
terized as large scale but single events, whereas, e.g., terrorist attacks in Europe can mostly be Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
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characterized as small scale but more frequent; second, 9/11 hit targets which stand not only 
symbolically but factually at the centre of global economic activity (not only the New York’s 
business and financial centre but also the aviation industry), thus subsequently causing major 
economic disruptions, which are not likely to ensue from the destruction of a target chosen 
only due to its political or symbolic value.  
4.1.1  Impacts at household level  
To our knowledge, no literature exists analyzing the direct costs that households experience 
due to terrorism itself, or due to subsequent disruptions of the economy (e.g., loss of employ-
ment). Nevertheless, some innovative approaches attempt to value the loss in life satisfaction 
and welfare that households experience due to the fear induced by acts of terrorism. As fear is 
highly subjective, it cannot be measured easily. Still, economic methods such as contingent 
valuation or the hedonic market approach can be employed to estimate the “price” of fear. 
Frey and Luechinger (2005) and Frey et al. (2009) combine indicators of welfare (from the 
Euro Barometer) with three terror indicators to analyze the impacts of terrorism on micro-
economic happiness in France, the Republic of Ireland and the UK. In all three countries, the 
estimations show that terrorist attacks have a statistically significant negative effect on re-
ported life satisfaction. This decrease in life satisfaction is amongst other things reflected in 
the hypothetical willingness of people to pay for a reduction of terrorism in the three coun-
tries. For instance, a resident of Northern Ireland (with an average household income) would 
be willing to pay 26% of his income for a reduction in terrorist activity (measured by the 
number of fatalities) or 37% of his income if terrorism is measured by the number of inci-
dents. By contrast, a resident of Paris would be willing to pay between 4% (number of fatali-
ties) and 8% (number of attacks) of their income, depending on how terrorism is measured 
(Frey et al. 2009).16  
Ultimately, psychological factors (such as fear as well as changes in life satisfaction and hap-
piness) can impact on economic behavior. That is, non-monetary effects of terrorist attacks 
may translate into significant monetary ones at household as well as on macroeconomic levels 
when the psychological impacts of fear change consumption behavior (Nair 2006), negatively 
affect labor productivity or require medical treatment. While impacts of the latter two are not 
discussed in the academic literature, consumption effects due to changes in life satisfaction 
and utility have received some attention. Here, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) show a marked 
decrease in consumption of non-durables that is related to changes in utility due to terrorism 
in Israel. Interestingly, the immediate response to the attacks of 9/11 showed an increase in 
                                                                          
16 Beyond the impacts on “quality of life”, acts of terrorism can have severe psychological effects that become 
apparent in stress and trauma. Studies from Israel demonstrate these traumatic effects of terrorist attacks: chil-
dren who have experienced a terrorist attack in their community show markedly higher levels of stress than chil-
dren who “merely” live under the same threat of terrorism (Mansdorf and Weinberg 2003). Stecklov and Goldstein 
(2006) discover signs for a traumatic impact of terrorist attacks, detecting a 35% increase of fatal accidents after a 
terrorist attack in Israel. For Columbia, Camacho (2008) finds that an increased exposition to random terrorist 
attacks is associated with increased stress which translates into lower child birth weights. Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
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consumer confidence particularly reflected in the consumer demand for durables, which for 
example Enders and Sandler (2005) explain as being driven by “patriotism” that spurred con-
sumption in an act of defiance against the attacks. Shieh et al. (2005) provide an alternative 
explanation for this increase, pointing out that when a terrorist attack is anticipated and the 
public is fully informed, short-term consumption may deviate from its long-term level. 
Households may be motivated to increase the consumption of certain goods before an an-
nounced terrorist attack as a temporary response to a shortened lifespan. Thus, rather than 
relating the increase in consumption to the initial attacks on the World Trade Centre, the au-
thors relate the increase in consumption to the expectation of future attacks which were an-
nounced by al-Qaeda and believed to be credible by the US Administration. However, in the 
long run Keyfitz (2004) shows that through their depressing effects on consumer confidence, 
"war jitters" and fears about weapons of mass destruction are estimated to have lowered 
(U.S.) consumption spending by 0.3 percent (equivalent to a cumulative US$ 40 billion) over 
the past two years. This matches some previously reported empirical studies which similarly 
suggest that terrorism may reduce consumption. 
Given the potentially significant economic impacts that the psychological effects of fear may 
cause, approaches to contain fear and thus mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack need to be 
identified.17  Although the causes of fear are a psychological rather than an economic prob-
lem18, a small body of economic literature exists that attempts to shed light on some determi-
nants of the fear caused by terrorism. One factor discussed in the literature is the phenomenon 
of “probability-neglect”. Research has produced evidence that people base their risk analysis 
on cognitive experiences of past events rather than actual probabilities of future events. That 
is, they employ the “availability heuristic” (Kunreuther 2002), which in the case of terrorism 
can lead to an overestimation of a terrorist attack which is usually characterized as a low 
probability event causing a high impact; in contrast, certain events which are more likely but 
cause a lower impact (e.g. car accidents) may be systematically underestimated.19 In other 
words, terrorism although less likely to implicate the ordinary citizen, will produce more fear 
than more probable risks (Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman 1993; Sunstein 2003; Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser 2003; Becker and Rubinstein 2004).20 The effects of terrorist attacks on risk per-
ception may also be dependent on certain individual factors such as sex or political affiliation 
(Fischhoff et al. 2003). Moreover, if terrorism not only produces fear but also other feelings 
(e.g., anger), the actual effect of terrorism on risk perception is contingent upon the interplay 
of various emotions (Lerner et al. 2003). In general, a variety of factors influence the factual 
                                                                          
17 In fact, as one of the objectives of terrorists is to cause fear, minimizing fear after a terror attack also implies 
minimizing the actual benefits received by terrorists from their violent action. 
18 The psychological impacts of terrorism have been discussed by, e.g., Katiuscia et al. (2003). 
19 This notion is supported by the finding of Gigerenzer (2006) who finds that American reduced air travel after 
9/11 to avoid being killed in the course of a (low probability) attack. As a consequence, more Americans were 
killed in car accidents (an underestimated event). 
20 These kinds of anomalies do not only occur with terrorism but also in other contexts of risk perception (Viscusi 
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changes in risk perception caused by a terrorist strike. Nevertheless, such changes in risk 
perception then may translate into changes in individual or public behavior. 
4.1.2  Impacts on private sector  
Businesses and firms have been direct and indirect victims to both domestic and transnational 
terrorism for a long time. According to the US Department of State, US businesses were the 
targets of over 80% of terrorist attacks in 2000 and nearly 90% in 2001 (Michel-Kerjan and 
Pedell 2006). One of the reasons for this increase is that companies source from, operate in 
and supply to insecure countries, thus exposing themselves to greater threats of terrorism; 
another important reason are substitution effects of terrorists who shift their attention from 
better protected public buildings towards relatively easier to targets. 
The actual direct losses of terrorist attacks depend on the characteristics of the attacked com-
pany but also on the nature of the attack and its impacts which may include, e.g., property 
damage or ransom payments for hostages. Overall, Enders and Sandler (2008) conclude that 
even if some sectors may face significant losses from terrorism, they are likely to recover 
quickly, given that the economy does not face sustained terrorist attacks.  
While direct physical losses without doubt hurt companies, 9/11 has shown that it is disrup-
tions in the interconnected economy which impact on businesses more severely. Even if busi-
nesses are not directly exposed to the physical destruction of an attack, terrorism can impact 
companies by increasing their overall level of market risk, credit risk, operational risk and 
business volume risk. Furthermore, stock market reactions to a terrorist attack, partly induced 
by the fear to lose capital, partly based on speculative behavior on future gains (or losses) of a 
company, can be detrimental to a company.  
In this context, the danger of supply chain interruptions has received much attention in the 
literature. It has been estimated that business interruptions accounted for one third of the en-
tire losses from 9/11 (Kleindorfer and Saad 2005). In general, companies experiencing supply 
chain disruptions underperform their peers significantly in stock performance as well as in 
operating performance as reflected in costs, sales and profits.  
This illustrates that it is not shocks on their own which create cataclysmic events but vulner-
abilities of the economic system which determine the impacts of an exogenous shock such as 
a terrorist attack. These vulnerabilities may arise from technical factors (e.g., the physical 
interdependence through communication and transportation) but also more elusive factors 
such as expectations on the functioning of the economic system: “longer paths and shorter 
clock speeds provide more opportunities for disruption and a smaller margin for error” 
(Kleindorfer and Saad: 53). Recent terror attacks such as 9/11 seem to have deliberately taken 
advantage of these vulnerabilities, striking targets of economic significance which led to a 
breakdown of economic activity even beyond the immediate target area. In contrast, attacks 
on targets of “mere” symbolic or political value are less likely to cause disruptions beyond the 
geographical locality of the attack. This is insofar important as reducing the economic impacts Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
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of terrorism should then not only focus on the actual threat but also on the extent to which the 
economic system on the whole has become more resilient or more vulnerable (Kunreuther 
2006). Evidently, the threat of terrorism may make a country more vulnerable and increase 
public demand for security. Such vulnerabilities and increases in security may negatively 
affect economic efficiency (e.g., by producing overhead investment in public security and 
emergency response). 
Apart from the direct and indirect disruptions, the private sector has to carry the burden of 
psychological impacts of terrorism; on the one hand, in their function as employers, on the 
other in their function as management decision makers being influenced by their own psycho-
logical reactions. As mentioned above, no rigorous analysis beyond anecdotal evidence exists 
that elicits the impact of fear of employees on the private sector. The case of the bombings of 
the London public transport system on July 7th, 2005 shows that it may be significant. Some 
firms reported that they had to find alternative means of transport for employees unwilling to 
use public transport into central London. For smaller firms this even constituted the principal 
cost of the attack (London Chamber of Commerce 2005). But it remains unknown how sig-
nificant these impacts are for the cost structure of companies or for labor productivity. 21 
 
4.1.3  Impacts on public policy / public sector  
Apart from households or consumers and the private sector, the public sector is the third eco-
nomic agent who is directly and indirectly affected by terrorism. There exists rarely any litera-
ture on the direct economic impact that terror inflicts on governments. While an estimate of 
the costs to the US government arising from 9/11 has been given above, the costs arising from 
physical destruction from small-scale terror attacks in general are not estimated, although they 
are likely to be relatively small.22   
Yet, potentially more significant, public sector policies before and after a terror attack are 
critical to contain and mitigate the economic impacts of a terrorist attack, and to restore order 
and confidence in the economy. Necessary policies can be differentiated according to their 
timing: on the one hand, governments have to build their emergency response preparedness 
before an attack; on the other hand, they have to institute appropriate short-run policies in 
response to an actual terror event.  
With regards to the first, health sector policies are particularly important to mitigate the im-
pacts of terrorism. Any large-scale terror attacks will put the public health infrastructure to the 
test, having to deal not only with mass casualties resulting from the event, but also the longer 
term impacts of physically and psychologically incapacitated victims. Organizing an effective 
                                                                          
21 The available literature how terrorism impacts on management decisions will be reviewed in the section   below. 
22 These costs arise whenever public infrastructure or buildings are destroyed in a terrorist attack, which can vary 
from government buildings, publicly organised transport and services infrastructure but also military structures 
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response challenges government institutions because the issues involved (e.g., eligibility for 
health care, the effects of low-level exposure to toxic agents, stress-related illnesses, unli-
censed therapeutics, financial compensation) are complex and controversial (Hyams et al. 
2002). Although the use of chemical, biological and nuclear (CBN) weapons as agents of 
terrorism has so far only occurred sporadically recent events demonstrate the increasing risk 
and possibility that terrorist groups may employ them against civilian targets, as demonstrated 
by the release of anthrax in the United States.23, It is expected that agents such as Bacillus 
anthracis and Yersinia pestis could leave hundreds of thousands dead or incapacitated (Evans 
et al. 2002).24 The impact of the attack will depend on a number of variables, including the 
agent used, the method of dispersal, but especially on the preparedness of the public health 
system to respond appropriately. Contingency planning so far almost exclusively involved 
detection, containment, and emergency health care for mass casualties. However, it is clear 
that even small-scale CBN incidents (the spread of anthrax spores through the mail) can cause 
widespread confusion, fear, and psychological stress that have lasting effects on the health of 
affected communities and on a nation's sense of well-being. 
Even though the preparedness and structure of the public health sector appears to play a sig-
nificant role in mitigating the short- and long-term economic effects of a terror attack, so far it 
has received little attention in the security economics literature. Neither the costs resulting 
from specific attacks nor the costs of different policy responses have been accounted for. 
Preparedness to tackle the impacts of a terror attack is only one side of the coin. The right 
response especially through economic policy is critical to restore confidence into the econ-
omy, thus minimizing a potential negative economic impact of a terror attack.25 Still, there is 
little rigorous analysis of appropriate monetary and fiscal responses to mitigate the economic 
impacts of terrorism. Baily (2001) in a policy report, outlines and comments briefly on US 
fiscal policies responding to the impacts of 9/11. These policy measures included the enact-
ment of tax cuts, distribution of rebates, the discussion of a tax stimulus package and the ap-
proval of US$ 40 billion by Congress for emergency spending measures that included military 
and security spending as well as reconstruction. Furthermore, the aviation industry was 
granted support to the amount of US$ 15 billion. He also provides an overview of US mone-
tary policies which followed the 9/11 attacks. Central to containing the shocks of the attack 
was the liquidity that the Federal Reserve Bank26, and the European Central Bank added to 
the system, thus allowing cash-strapped banks to borrow money more easily. Moreover, a 
0.5% point cut in interest rates stimulated spending. Lacker (2004) confirms these findings, 
                                                                          
23 One widely known incidence of a chemical terrorist attack was the dispersion of Sarin gas in the subway of 
Tokyo in 1995. 
24 However, Ackerman and Moran (2006) note that terrorists are generally not very likely to use CBN devices as 
their weapon of choice due to the technological complexity of such devices. 
25 The London Chamber of Commerce in its report on the economic effects of terrorism on London points out that 
even though the attacks on the London public transport system on July 7
th, 2005 caused relatively little destruc-
tion, it significantly decreased the confidence of the business community in the economy (London Chamber of 
Commerce 2005) 
26 After 9/11, the Federal Reserve injected more than $ 100 billion in additional liquidity. Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
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reviewing the monetary and payment system consequences, highlighting that the relatively 
benign banking conditions helped to make the Fed’s credit policy manageable. Based on 
Lacker’s report and a general overview of the existing literature, it can be concluded that the 
US’s fiscal and monetary policy responses were critical in attenuating potentially even worse 
economic effects of the terrorist attack (cf. Llussa and Tavares 2008). 
4.2  Impacts across sectors 
Terrorism impacts differently across various economic sectors. Impacts differ depending on 
the nature of the attack and its target, whether a sector is directly hit or whether its activities 
are “merely” interrupted by the disruptions that a terrorist attack may cause. With respect to 
the first, the tourism sector has been a frequent target of terrorism. No analysis exists on the 
economic impacts that direct effects of terrorism have on the tourism industry. Rather, the 
literature concentrates on the analysis of changes in demand structures as the predominant 
economic impact of terrorism on the tourism industry which will be discussed later in the 
report. 
The transport sector (aviation, maritime transport, road and railways) has been another direct 
target of terrorist attacks, reflected for example in the attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent acts 
in Europe.27 The aviation industry has been particularly conducive to terrorists. In the specific 
case of 9/11, the aviation industry is said to have “lost more in one year than it had made in its 
entire history” (IATA Director General and CEO Pierre J. Jeanniot)28, firstly, due to the in-
curred physical losses of four airplanes, secondly, due to subsequent airport closures and 
disruptions in services, thirdly, due to the negative impacts on the value of airline stocks, and 
fourthly, due to changes in passenger and cargo demand patterns for air transport (Drakos 
2004), which will be discussed in the section below. 
Even sectors who are not directly implicated in a terrorist attack can suffer from the conse-
quences of economic disruption. Especially attacks on the transport sector can lead to severe 
delays in the movement of goods and services which have been discussed as “supply chain 
disruptions” above. The scale of the impact and which sectors will be affected is be deter-
mined by the nature of the attack and the target. Once again 9/11 represents an unprecedented 
outlier that caused severe disruptions across a wide range of sectors, hitting a globally signifi-
cant economic hub. In contrast, even though severe, the subsequent bombings in London and 
Madrid did hardly cause any disruptions even in the local economy (London Chamber of 
Commerce 2005). 
Until today, especially the direct impacts of terrorism have been confined to a relatively small 
set of sectors. This, however, does not mean that there are no other sectors which could poten-
                                                                          
27 These attacks include the Madrid train bombings, the attacks on the London public transport system and the 
unsuccessful attempts to bomb commuter trains in Germany. 
28 This statement was made during the opening day of the Airline Financial Summit, New York City, 8 April, 2002 
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tially become targets of terrorism in the future. For example, the agricultural sector has been 
identified by some as potentially attractive to terrorists, with possibly detrimental effects not 
only on the sector itself but also society at large (Chalk 2001; Singh 2009). Yet the actual 
degree of risk is contested (Blandford 2002). Even if these policy reports constitute the in-
formed opinion of policy advocacy coalitions rather than scientific papers, the lesson that 
should be drawn is that terrorism could provide surprises by aiming at previously unthinkable 
targets. 
Within the sectors affected by terrorism, the insurance sector plays a somewhat special role as 
it neither experiences destruction directly nor is negatively affected by disruptions of the 
economy, but suffers under the consequences of terrorism through ensuing payment claims. 
While insurance companies are able to cover small terror attacks such as sporadic bombings 
with localized impacts, 9/11 dealt a particular blow to the insurance and re-insurance industry, 
firstly, due to claims at the scale of billions of dollars and, secondly, due to negative impacts 
on stock markets which affected the capital base of insurance companies. Consequently, 9/11 
triggered important changes in the insurance market. The main problem that 9/11 posed was 
the number and the volume of simultaneous claims, exceeding the capital insurance compa-
nies held (Alexander and Alexander 2002). Claims to insurance companies related to 9/11 
totaled US$ 50 to 80 billion which was partly paid by primary insurers and partly by re-
insurances. Importantly, while the tragedy of 9/11 unfolded in the United States, much of the 
costs (in total an estimated US$ 1.3 billion) were carried by European insurance companies 
(ibid). With 9/11, the insurance industry realized that terrorism had reached a new scale that 
does not comply with conventional insurability criteria: since 9/11, it is difficult to measure 
the risks associated with terrorism which renders it next to impossible to calculate insurance 
premiums accurately (Cummins 2002; Hogarth 2002; Wolgast 2002; Caplan 2003; Cummins 
2003; Ericson and Doyle 2004; Dixon and Reville 2005). In practice, the insurance sector 
reacted with raising premiums drastically (between 50-100%) which hit particularly shipping 
and transport companies (airlines)29 (Walkenhorst and Dihel 2002) and owners of large com-
mercial property. As the “unimaginable” had happened and led to an unquantifiable risk, 
insurance companies also announced the exclusion of terrorism coverage unless government 
support was granted. Intervention of the government in the insurance market, which under 
normal conditions counters liberal market philosophies, has therefore received much aca-
demic attention: the literature analyzing different government interventions in the insurance 
market across countries concludes that the case of terrorism may represent an instance where 
public intervention and even subsidies are necessary for maintaining some market forces, 
rather than using regulation (or the lack thereof common in most OECD economies before 
9/11) to stifle the market for terror insurance (Brown 2002; Russell 2002; Brown et al. 2004; 
Chalk 2005). 
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While in general terrorist attacks are associated to incur costs and losses across sectors, a few 
sectors may in fact benefit from attacks. Berrebi and Klor (2005) assess impacts of terrorist 
attacks during the second Intifada on the stock value of Israeli companies differentiating be-
tween security and non-security industries.30  They find that terror attacks had a significant 
negative impact of 5% on non-defence related companies, in contrast to a significantly posi-
tive effect of 7% on defence and security related companies. These coefficients translate into 
an average loss of US$ 65 million in the market capitalization of non defence-related compa-
nies, and an average increase of US$ 53 million in the market capitalization of defence related 
companies, induced by expected increased demand of stock traders. 
4.3  Impacts on Financial Markets 
The large scale impacts of various financial crises in the last century have highlighted the 
significance of financial markets in the economy. Exogenous shocks such as terrorist events 
are generally expected to impact negatively on financial market values. Once again, 9/11 
takes a special place within the literature, yet it is necessary to differentiate the impacts of this 
singular large scale event from impacts of protracted terrorism such as in Israel and Spain 
(Basque country). 
Chen and Siems (2004) who study the impacts of terrorist events on the US capital market in 
comparison to other military attacks31, show that the latter led to substantial negative cumula-
tive returns. In contrast, the event of terrorist bombing attacks32 produced no abnormal returns 
on the day of the attack. The only terrorist attack with a significant impact was 9/11: even 
after six trading days markets showed negative cumulative abnormal returns. Nonetheless, 
they conclude that the magnitude of the shocks were even if significant, still not without 
precedent in history, i.e., the reaction to the attack was less severe than reactions to previous 
shocks. In accordance with others (e.g., Enders and Sandler 2005; Enders and Sandler 2008; 
Brück 2006), they conclude that the contained shock of the financial and stock markets are 
largely due to increased resilience of US capital markets to exogenous shocks. 
The idea that more developed markets react less to terrorist attacks is confirmed by Arin et al. 
(2008). They show that while terrorism influences stock market volatility across a sample of 
six countries, the magnitude of the volatility effect depends on the level of development of the 
attacked markets; for emerging markets, the effect of terrorism on stock markets is more pro-
nounced. 
                                                                          
30 Stock market values are a good indicator for the actual economic damage of a terrorist attack, as they provide 
information on the expected impacts on future returns and risk perception, given that the speculative element on 
the behaviour of others is kept in mind (Frey et al, 2004). 
31 These military attacks include the invasion of France (1940) or North Korea (1950). 
32 The terrorist attacks incorporate are the bombing of Pan Am (December 21, 1988), the World Trade Center 
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In comparison, protracted events in smaller markets can have significant impacts as illustrated 
by Eldor and Melnick's (2004) study of the impacts of the Israeli capital markets. Analyzing 
the impacts of terrorist attacks on stock and foreign exchange markets in Israel (1990-2003), 
they find that suicide attacks have permanent impacts on both markets, while other type of 
attacks do not; overall, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reduced the stock market capitalization 
substantially. Interestingly, they find that even after continued experiences with the Palestin-
ian-Israeli conflict the stock market still reacts to suicide bombings, which may be explained 
by the fact that stock purchases are not just based on the expectation of the future value of the 
firm but also on the expected behavior of others. 
Zussman and Zussman (2006) also find that Israeli stock markets react to news linked to ter-
rorism and counter-terrorism. In their study counter-terrorism efforts by the Israeli govern-
ment (i.e., the assassination of members of Palestinian terrorist organizations) may translate 
into stock market gains or losses, depending on the rank of the assassinated member (where 
only assassinations of high-ranked members yield positive effects). 
In Zussman et al. (2008), periods of violence are associated with a decrease in asset prices, 
while periods of peace (and the success of politicians favoring peace) results in an increase in 
asset prices. Overall, this finding is in line with the previously reported ones and indicates that 
markets react to terrorist violence (i.e., individual attacks, prolonged periods of violence, and 
prolonged periods of peace) in anticipated ways. 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) show a negative relation between terrorism and stock market 
values in the case of the Basque country. They show that stock markets react to an unexpected 
change in the risk of terrorism and not only to individual terrorist attacks (cf. Eldor and Mel-
nick 2004). With the announcement of the cease fire, Basque stocks outperformed non-
Basque stocks, while at the end of the cease fire, Basque stocks showed a negative perform-
ance. This indicates that stock markets in the Basque country reacted to the changes in risk 
associated with terrorism in the expected ways. This finding is in line with Zussman et al. 
(2008) for the Isreali-Palestine conflict. 
In summary, while the impacts of a large-scale singular event in a comparatively well-
diversified capital and stock market may be relatively short lived and small, the impact of 
protracted terror events (and changes in terror risk due to changes in the political landscape), 
even if smaller in scale, in relatively less diversified markets may create lasting negative im-
pacts. 
4.4 Macro-economic  impacts 
While a micro-economic analysis provides a disaggregate account of the impacts of terror on 
different agents and elements of the economy, an aggregate analysis identifying the impacts 
on various macro-economic variables sheds light on the repercussions of terrorism on the 
overall state of the economy. In this context, the literature focuses on two key variables to Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
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show the direct impacts of terror attacks, namely economic growth and economic integration 
(trade and capital flows). 
4.4.1 Growth   
The literature in general finds that impacts of terrorist attacks on growth are short-lived. It is 
estimated that 9/11 caused losses in US productivity amounting to US$ 35 billion, 47 billion 
in total output and a rise in unemployment by almost 1% in the following quarter (Sandler and 
Enders 2004). Still, in general these impacts appear to have had relatively little significance 
for the US economy thanks not only to the latter’s size and maturity but also due to prudent 
government policies which have been outlined above.33 
9/11 is an outlier compared to repercussions that more frequent smaller scale attacks incur 
especially when they happen in less diversified economies than the United States. The im-
pacts of terrorism on the economies of Spain (especially the Basque country) and Israel have 
been studied in depth and provide illustrative examples. Both case studies show the negative 
impact that terror attacks can have on small scale economies, especially when these attacks 
are not single events but continue over a longer period of time. In the case of Spain, Abadie 
and Gardeazabal (2003) estimate the overall economic effects of terror in the Basque Coun-
try34: after the outbreak of the ETA-campaign in 1975, GDP per capita declined about 12 
percentage points relative to the synthetic control region in the late 1970’s and about 10 per-
centage points during the 1980s and 1990s. In the case of Israel, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) 
estimate that Israel’s per capita output could be 10% higher in 2004, had Israel not suffered 
from terror in the preceding three years. 
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) provide an empirical investigation of the relationship between 
terrorism and economic growth for another developed part of the world, namely Western 
Europe for 1971-2004. They again find that terrorist activity reduces economic activity. For 
instance, for this part of the world an additional transnational terrorist attack per million in-
habitants translates into a reduction of economic growth by about 0.4%. Similarly, domestic 
terrorism also has growth-reducing effects. The study concludes that both kinds of terrorism 
affect economic growth differently: while transnational terrorism leads to a crowding out of 
investment, domestic terrorism tends to lead to an increase of inefficient government spend-
ing. 
Focusing on a less-developed country, Araz-Takay et al. (2009) find that terrorism also re-
duces economic activity in emerging markets. The study also finds a non-linear relationship 
                                                                          
33 It is methodologically difficult to clearly relate growth dynamics to terrorism given that the US economy was 
already facing a recession (Enders and Sandler 2008). In more general words, the problem to assess impacts lies 
in the missing counterfactual as it is unknown how an economy would have developed without the terrorist attack 
(Frey and Luechinger 2004). 
34 The authors construct a “synthetic” control region to overcome the problem of the counterfactual, using a 
combination of other Spanish regions that resembles the Basque Country before the onset of the terrorism cam-
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between terrorism and economic performance, so negative growth effects of terrorism are 
particularly strong in times of economic expansion.35  
The negative relation between terrorist attacks and growth found in these studies are con-
firmed at a more general level by Blomberg et al. (2004a). Employing a cross country regres-
sion with observations from 177 countries between 1968 and 2000, they find that terrorism 
depresses economies significantly. Importantly, the effect of terrorism is smaller and less 
persistent than the economic impacts of conflict. Similarly, Crain and Crain (2006) also esti-
mate that a reduction in terrorist activity leads to a marked increase in income, analyzing a 
panel of 147 countries for the period of 1968-2002. For the year of 2002, the study finds that 
an elimination of all transnational terrorism would have caused an increase in global income 
of US$ 3.6 trillion. Evidently, the reduction of terrorism would also lead to other positive 
economic effects, e.g. an increase in fixed capital investment.  
To contextualize the negative economic impact of terrorism, Tavares (2004) compares the 
scale of different shocks, namely terrorist campaigns, natural disasters and financial crises. He 
finds that terrorist attacks on civilian and military targets (as opposed to e.g. public or gov-
ernment buildings) are the most detrimental, leading to potential decreases in GDP growth of 
up to 0.25% points. In comparison natural disasters have negative and significant impacts, 
currency crises negative and very significant impacts on GDP growth. When standard growth 
variables are included into the analysis, terrorism in fact exhibits no influence on growth. In 
sum, after taking into account additional determinants of income growth36, he concludes that 
natural disasters and currency crises impact on growth, but not terrorism. Similarly, the eco-
nomic effects of terrorism on growth are smaller and less persistent than the economic im-
pacts of conflict (Blomberg et al. 2004a). 
 
Table 1: Some Empirical Evidence on the Growth Effects of Terrorism 





Terrorist activity reduced per capita income. 
Inter alia, terrorism negatively influenced the 






Domestic terrorism has a small effect on growth 
by mainly increasing (unproductive) government 
spending. Transnational terrorism more strongly 
                                                                          
35 Araz-Takay et al. (2009) also show that economic performance influences terrorist activity (i.e., as a terror 
determinant) in Turkey in particular in times of economic decline. This matches our discussion in Section 3 on the 
possible impact of economic factors on the generation of terrorism. 
36 These determinants include the country’s population—to control for scale effects—, the degree of trade open-
ness, the rate of inflation, the share of primary goods exports in merchandise exports, the size of government 
measured as the share of government spending in GDP and the share of government spending in education. 
These variables capture most of the economic indicators shown to be associated with economic growth in cross-
country growth empirics. Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
  40
reduces growth by crowding out investment. 




Terror has a large and negative impact on eco-
nomic activity. This impact is stronger in times 
of economic expansion. 
Blomberg et al. 
(2004a) 
Unbalanced Panel 
of 177 Countries, 
1968-2000 
Terrorism reduces growth, but the effect is rela-
tively small (e.g. compared to external war). 
Terrorism may reduce growth by fostering gov-
ernment spending. 
Crain and Crain 
(2006) 
Panel Data for 
147 Countries, 
1968-2002 
Terrorism reduces economic growth and per 
capita income. Potential channels from terror to 
growth are reduced investment and tourism. 
Tavares (2004)  Cross-Country 
Data, 1987-2001 
Terrorism is not an important determinant of 
growth, once it is controlled for a number of 






Terror reduces economic activity, e.g. by affect-
ing consumption, investment and trade unfavor-
able. 
 
Even local economies appear to be able to recover quickly, given a certain degree of eco-
nomic maturity. Especially cities and urban areas have been frequent targets of terrorist at-
tacks. In theory, terrorism influences settlement patterns and urban areas through (i) the safe-
harbor effect, (ii) the target-effect and (iii) the transportation effect (Brück 2006). Terrorism 
could therefore be understood as a “tax” on cities. The general consensus of the literature on 
war and cities in the 20th century shows that (especially in the long-run) costs to cities due to 
destruction are relatively low (Eisinger 2004; Brück 2006), where certain extreme events 
(Glaeser and Shapiro 2002) and especially prominent (target) parts of a city (Abadie and 
Dermisi 2008) may possibly be exceptions. Even for the large-scale event of 9/11 Bram 
(2002) concludes that although New York City suffered from the attack, the major economic 
disruptions appear to have been short-lived and conditions began to recover already in 2002. 
To conclude and as partially summed up in Table 1, macroeconomic consequences of terror-
ism events are generally noticeable, where growth and income can be affected by the negative 
(distorting) effects of terrorism on consumption and public and private investment (e.g., 
Llussa and Tavares 2009). Still, the negative effects of terrorism mostly appear to be of a 
rather modest and short-term nature. This is especially true for large and diversified econo-
mies that are able to withstand severe economic impacts through their ability to quickly real-
locate capital and labor, given the immediate effects are localized. In contrast, the macroeco-
nomic effects of terrorist attacks on small, less-developed economies are likely to be stronger, Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
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especially when these countries face sustained terrorist campaigns (cf. Enders and Sandler 
2008). 
4.4.2  Trade and FDI 
Another set of macroeconomic variables receiving attention in the literature is international 
trade and investment. Terrorism affects trade directly when traded goods and infrastructure 
become terrorism targets37, or when an increased level of insecurity stalls trade between coun-
tries, making it more costly (Mirza and Verdier 2008). Further negative impacts arise from 
increased security measures at for example border posts or important transport hubs, which 
will be discussed in Section 6. Quantifications of the trade impact are provided by Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2004) who assess the impact of terrorism on trade between more than 200 coun-
tries for the period 1960 to 1993. According to their results, countries targeted by terrorism 
trade significantly less with each other than countries not affected by terrorism. Moreover, the 
effect is economically large: a doubling of terrorist events in a trading partner’s country is 
estimated to reduce international trade by 4%. Blomberg and Hess (2006) calculate that, for a 
given year, the presence of terrorism, as well as internal and external conflict is equivalent to 
as much as a 30 percent tariff on trade. This is larger than estimated tariff-equivalent costs of 
border and language barriers and tariff-equivalent reduction through GSPs and participation 
in the World Trade Organization. In general, the literature agrees that flows of international 
trade may be negatively affected by terrorism events. 
As for foreign direct investment, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) argue that terrorism leads to 
changes in the net foreign direct investment position of countries affected by terrorism. In 
theory, terrorism increases uncertainty and decreases expected returns to investment, conse-
quently causing global capital shifts. Empirically, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) show that 
increase in terror risk are associated with substantial falls in the net foreign direct investment 
position of targeted economies. This matches previous findings by Enders and Sandler (1996) 
that for Spain and Greece similarly show that terrorist activity leads to a decline in FDI in the 
respective countries. That is, terrorism may distort international capital flows, especially when 
the global economic system is open enough and therefore allows for rapid adjustments of 
investment in the face of terror risks. 
4.5  Political consequences of terrorism 
This survey is to focus on the economic analysis of terrorism. Nevertheless, one essential goal 
of terrorism (beside economic destabilization) is the destabilization of the political system. 
We thus do not want to leave out the political consequences of terrorism, especially as they 
                                                                          
37 Attacks on trade infrastructure include for example the repeated attacks on oil pipelines in Iraq after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, which temporarily paralyzed oil exports; or the attack launched on the French supertanker 
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have been analyzed from an economic point of view and as political effects of terrorism may 
easily translate into economic ones, e.g., following changes in government composition or 
policies. The political consequences of terrorism are of particular importance for democratic 
countries in which terrorist actions may e.g. lead to noticeable effects on voting behavior. 
For the case of Israel, Berrebi and Klor (2008) offer evidence that the occurrence of a terrorist 
attack leads to more electoral support for right-wing parties. That is, the empirical findings 
indicate that voters are sensitive to terrorist actions, especially if they come along with fatali-
ties or occur close to home. The results indicate that terrorist organizations time terrorist ac-
tions to influence voting behavior, e.g. in order to make democratic regimes to make conces-
sions. 
Similarly, the findings of Gassebner et al. (2008) suggest that terrorism exerts a positive effect 
on government replacement. Analyzing the relationship between terrorism and the probability 
of re-election over the period 1968-2002, the study finds that terrorist attacks increase the rate 
of government replacement at the next election, with severe attacks exercising stronger ef-
fects. The study’s finding again point at the potential of terrorist organization to produce po-
litical fallout that matches their goal of political destabilization. 
Furthermore, the findings of Indridason (2008) show another possibility of how terrorism may 
generate political effects. Considering the relationship between terrorism and cabinet forma-
tion for 17 Western European democracies over the period of 1950-2006, it is found that gov-
ernments formed in times of terrorism are more likely to be surplus governments and less 
likely to be polarized ones. That is, terrorism tends to destabilize governments with no or 
short majorities and forces political elites to bridge political and social cleavages. Again this 
indicates that terrorism may constitute an important factor shaping domestic politics. 
Lastly, the results of Gross et al. (2009) show a different mechanism through which terrorism 
affects the polity. Here, the attacks of 9/11 are found to first increase confidence in govern-
mental institutions, where this confidence then fades away in the months after the attacks. The 
study detects a reciprocal relationship between confidence and hope, and also positive rela-
tionships between hope, pride, and confidence. Apparently, terrorist attacks may affect the 
emotional basis of an attacked society, where such emotional changes may translate into 
changes considering the effectiveness of the government (which may in turn affect voting 
behavior). 
In general, some evidence (albeit sometimes anecdotal) indicates that terrorist organizations 
may be successful in achieving political destabilization as it manifests in voting behavior, 
government durability or formation. Consequentially, the political repercussions of terrorism 
may translate into economic ones, e.g., as public policies towards terrorism and security are 
affected. Economics of Insecurity – Economic Effects of Terrorism 
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4.6  The determinants of the economic impacts of terrorism 
This section has shown that terrorism may produce substantial economic (and socio-political) 
costs, e.g., by impairing economic growth and development. In general, we find some support 
for the notion that terrorists have been successful in achieving one of their fundamental goals, 
namely economic destabilization. As we shall discuss below, the effectiveness of terrorism in 
this context may depend on some factors. However, before discussing these points, we first 
want to revive an aspect we hinted at before, namely the issue of reverse causation. As argued 
before, while terrorists strive for economic destabilization they are also affected by the eco-
nomic conditions they face in their country of origin (or in their target countries). That is, 
economic conditions may be (negatively) determined by terrorism but, at the same time, ter-
rorism may also be influenced by economic conditions. This issue has not been taken seri-
ously by some empirical approaches reviewed before. Thus, some caution is advised (as with 
the determinants of terrorism discussed in Section 3), given that reverse causation (and related 
biases) cannot be ruled out. Future research should focus on this issue in more detail. 
Given that the issue of causation has not been studied extensively, we need to resort to the 
existing (potentially biased) evidence to assess how terrorism affects the economy (and pol-
ity). Here, a number of factors seem to determine the effectiveness of terrorism in achieving 
economic destabilization. These factors can be classified into three broad categories: the na-
ture and characteristics of terror; the degree to which impacts are mitigated; and the maturity 
of the economy (or polity). 
As has been argued above, terrorist attacks differ in the degree to which they harm an econ-
omy (or polity) depending on some key dimensions, including (i) the severity of the attack 
(which influences the extent of physical damage); (ii) the frequency of the attacks which re-
sults not only in the accumulation of direct losses but also in changes in the behavior of 
agents; (iii) the target and its direct relevance to the economy, e.g., as an attack on a govern-
ment building, while costly, is likely to disrupt economic activity less than an attack on any 
critical infrastructure.  
Regarding the severity of terrorism, there is an agreement that it has increased (Frey and 
Luechinger 2002; Enders and Sandler 2005; Human Security Centre 2006; Bellany 2007). 
Enders and Sandler (2002) find that an act of terrorism is about 17% more likely to result in 
casualties compared to the 1970s, which can be explained by the increased incidence of 
bombings in the proportion of deadly incidents (as compared to hostage takings, assassina-
tions), the high proportion of mostly crowded civilian targets38 and the rise of suicide attacks, 
which have a higher average rate of fatalities. Regarding the distribution of terror attacks, a 
shift of incidences of terrorism towards the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and to a lesser de-
gree South Asia has been recorded. Collectively these regions carry the main burden of inter-
national terrorism (Human Security Centre 2005; Coolsaet and Van de Voorde 2006; Enders 
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and Sandler 2006). However, it is true that Europe and the United States (even if they do not 
experience a higher frequency of terrorism) surely suffer an increased severity of terrorism, 
not least as suicide attacks that are on average more deadly than other incidences, until 9/11 
were unconceivable (very much in contrast to countries such as Israel).  
Regarding the frequency of terrorist strikes, the literature agrees that, accounting for the cycli-
cal nature of terrorism, there is no increase in the incidences of terrorism (Sandler and Enders 
2004). Still there is an open discussion in the literature: Frey and Luechinger (2002) contend 
that terrorism incidences have decreased since the mid-1990s, while for example Bellany 
(2007) argues that there is no visible trend at all.  
The nature of the attack, its severity and location are not the only factors that determine the 
actual impact. The economic impact of terrorism are partly determined by the structure of the 
economic system itself, as argued above and summarized succinctly by Enders and Sandler 
(2008). The case of 9/11 is illustrative for the resilience of a mature, diversified economy to a 
large-scale shock. Even if the al-Qaeda’s attack caused large-scale destruction and disruption 
of even geographically remote economic activity, the economic effect on the US and the 
global economy remained transitory. In contrast, only two terrorist attacks in Yemen dealt a 
severe blow to its economy which was largely based on its importance as a shipping port.39 
This illustrates the importance of the size and diversity of an economy which determine its 
ability to absorb shocks (ibid). Little attention has so far been paid on how terrorism impacts 
on small- and less-developed economies. Blomberg et al. (2004a) provide some insights con-
firming the above, yet, these are not sufficient according to Enders and Sandler (2008) to 
provide an adequate picture. Drawing inferences from the factors that stabilize economies, 
one can conclude that developing countries are likely to suffer more under terrorism due to (i) 
limited institutional abilities, (ii) small and often fragmented markets and (iii) policy inflexi-
bility, e.g., in the case of high debt burdens.  
Beyond economic factors, Tavares (2004) points out that the prevalence of democratic free-
doms and rights may act stabilizing, even if not in terms of the occurrence of acts of terror-
ism40, at least in terms of reducing economic costs. In other words, his research shows that 
democracies are better able to withstand even a severe terrorist incidence. Yet, while the ma-
turity of an economy is important to withstand a terror attack, it is not a sufficient condition. 
As pointed out in the literature, appropriate response reactions, particularly government poli-
cies are important to contain the escalation of negative repercussions. This, firstly, is deter-
mined at a technical level by the country’s ability to provide relief and manage emergency 
and rescue actions effectively. Similarly, when a natural disaster occurs, a country’s emer-
gency preparedness is crucial in containing costs. Although not discussed explicitly in the 
                                                                          
39 In 2000, a US ship was hit by a terrorist attack while refuelling in Yemen’s shipping port. This incidence was 
followed in 2002 by a terrorist attack against a French tanker. Even though Yemen’s port had a comparative 
advantage due to its location, these two incidences led to the collapse of Yemen’s shipping industry as shipping 
activities were relocated to neighbouring ports. This had severe negative repercussions on Yemen’s overall 
economy, which is largely dependent on its transport hub. 
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literature, anecdotal evidence indicates that the preparedness of households and private indi-
viduals is critical to support relief efforts and mitigate damage.41 Related to this, but also 
related to general economic activity is the preparedness of service providers (especially of 
critical infrastructure) to remain operational in the event of an emergency, therefore contain-
ing the disruption in economic activity which leads to the escalation of impacts. Apart from 
the direct technicalities of emergency response, the ability of government institutions to apply 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policies and restore confidence into the economy form crucial 
part to mitigate impacts. It has been argued that well-orchestrated macroeconomic policies 
cushioned the blows of 9/11 (Chen and Siems 2004). 
 
 
                                                                          
41 This has been suggested by for example R. Ackermann, vice-president of the International Association of Fire 
and Rescue Services CTIF in his presentation at the European Security Research Conference SCR ’07, March 
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